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vABSTRACT 
Japan and South Korea share many similarities. Both have experienced periods 
of extraordinary growth, both have advanced market economies, and both have 
recently experienced the first transition between parties that control its executive 
branch. In each case, scholars have blamed the new parties for instability. 
The Democratic Party of Japan’s rule witnessed base issues that exacerbated U.S.-
Japan relations, the 3/11 disaster, and the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, an 
action that increased tension with China over the disputed territory. In South Korea, Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presided over the “desecuritization” of the North Korean 
threat, heated anti-American protests, and a near conflict with Tokyo over the disputed 
Dokdo Islands. These were all tense scenarios for new leaders. But were they tense 
because of these administrations’ policies and actions; that is, do political parties in 
Tokyo and Seoul actually matter? Or would these outcomes have occurred regardless? 
It is the conclusion of this research that the administrations did contribute to the 
instability within East Asia; however, their impact on regional stability was transitory. 
Each administration attempted significant policy changes and each had differing degrees 
of failure because of international and domestic constraints that tended to reinforce the 
status quo. 
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Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have many similarities. Each is a democracy, all 
share strong ties with the United States (U.S.), and each country has seen the first change 
of democratically elected party control of its government within the last two decades. 
One other distinction they share is that this political transition at home occurred in the 
context of a rise in regional tension.  
Each country voted the new parties into power with the hope of change; however, 
is that what these parties provided? What part, if any, did each of the new administrations 
play in causing regional tension? This thesis pursues questions mainly with regard to 
Japan and South Korea, with Taiwan as an additional illustrative comparison case. 
In Japan, under the Yukio Hatoyama administration, the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) created major alliance problems between Japan and the United States over a 
base move within the Okinawa prefecture and the cancellation of an Indian Ocean 
refueling mission. The administration of Hatoyama’s DPJ successor, Naoto Kan, 
nationalized the Senkaku Islands; this action not only derailed Hatoyama’s Yuai policy, 
but also resulted in a tense escalation of fighter sorties and ship harassment that raised the 
probability of armed conflict between the two sides.1 
In South Korea, progressive president Kim Dae-Jung’s (KDJ’s) administration 
ushered in a rise of anti-American sentiment, blaming U.S. policy against North Korea 
(DPRK) for diminishing progress under the Sunshine Policy. U.S. President George W. 
Bush “Scorned the ‘Sunshine’ or engagement policy of South Korea’s President Kim 
Dae-jung, and expressed skepticism about North Korea’s supposedly peaceful 
intentions.”2 Then Kim’s progressive successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (RMH), ran for 
                                                 




2 Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 79, JSTOR: 2003 
3164. 
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president in 2002–2003, fueling overtly anti-American nationalist sentiment.3 As 
President Kim was finally warming to America, President Roh was elected and led South 
Korea to new heights of anti-Americanism.4 As a result, Korean relations with the United 
States reached their lowest point while relations with the DPRK improved in the short 
term.5 
In Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian became the first former-opposition, non-Kuomintang 
(KMT) president in 2000. His popular support stemmed from the independence 
movement, which consequently made him unpopular with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). During the Chen administration, cross-Strait relations (CSR) fell to their lowest 
point in decades. “Washington and Beijing began to’ ‘co-manage’ Taiwan.”6 Eventually, 
the PRC passed an anti-secession law, which states that any attempt to declare 
independence would result in PRC opposition by all means necessary, to include force.7  
Instability did occur in each case. Japan and China became more confrontational, 
especially regarding the Senkaku Islands. The Republic of Korea (ROK) became 
increasingly anti-American, especially through RMH’s Uri Party. Taiwan’s CSR during 
Chen Shui-bian’s administration deteriorated to a level comparable to those under prior 
president Lee Teng-hui, although without reliving another 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.  
While these former-opposition governments appear to have presided over a 
significant amount of change, the actual degree of change and the extent to which that 
change can be attributed to the political parties themselves is less clear. KDJ’s overtures 
to North Korea were confounded by the Bush administration’s heavy-handed approach to 
the DPRK, by Kim Jong-Il’s political maneuvering to drive a wedge between the United 
                                                 
3 Victor D. Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?,” Current History 102, no. 
665 (September 2003): 279–84. 
4 Katherine H. S. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism and Democratic Consolidation,” in 
Korea’s Democratization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 130–
55. 
5 Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?,” 281. 
6 Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, 
ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2013), 302. 
7 Ibid., 301. 
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States and the ROK, and by domestic political challenges that would eventually see KDJ 
prosecuted for corruption and RMH impeached. Kim and Roh made changes by 
channeling popular support for their actions to counter political opposition, which 
consequently put them in a hostile relationship with the United States; a tough position to 
be in with the nation’s security guarantor. Hatoyama bypassed and marginalized Japan’s 
strong bureaucracy to effect changes that might not have been possible otherwise, but it 
also distanced him from the collective wisdom of the bureaucratic institutions, which 
were predisposed to see him fail. The DPJ’s inexperience and dismissal of bureaucratic 
experts resulted in mistakes upon which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) easily 
capitalized. Chen Shui-bian’s presidency was severely constrained by the Legislative 
Yuan, China, and the United States, but he moved forward with corruption reform, 
attempts to increase Taiwan’s international space, and American military equipment 
purchases. In the end, Chen was only marginally effective at best, and perhaps, 
counterproductive and dangerous in reality. 
When new and less-experienced political parties take power in East Asia, they  
do have the ability to make a difference, but three major constraints can be observed:  
(1) inexperienced leadership and strong opposition prevents enactment of the ruling 
party’s agenda, which tends to be overly ambitious, (2) international and domestic 
constraints, such as prevailing ideas that provide unforeseen impediments to new parties 
in power, and (3) the instability evidenced by new party changes has the potential to 
become routinized as institutions learn to accommodate pluralistic policy views, new 
parties gain insights into governing that moderate their message, and regional actors learn 
that democratic politics may not necessarily favor its strategic interests, but rather, may 
increase the legitimacy of domestic decision making in the democratic countries in the 
long run. 
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as it heads to its second term in 
office, seems to provide an important caveat. Although newly elected DPP president Tsai 
Ing-wen has successfully moderated her party’s views and claimed the presidency, the 
PRC views the DPP as hostile to PRC interests regardless of its stated position. Taiwan’s 
ambiguous state/sub-state position, coupled with the diverging interests of the PRC and 
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Taiwan, appear to place the two on a collision course. The underlying shifting identity 
within the Taiwan populace, and not any specific president or administration, appears to 
be the driving force of this instability. 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan each have been the subject of numerous articles 
and books. An attempt follows to review the most pertinent works relating to the 
countries and areas that this thesis covers. Relevant theoretical frameworks for regional 
stability analyses are presented first, and then actual comparative analyses are reviewed. 
While multiple comparative studies integrate the three countries, the few that also tie in 
their democratic institutions and regional stability are reviewed. Finally, this review 
addresses whether the parties actually matter.  
The concept of “regional stability” does not provide a rigid scale with which to 
measure variations. Robert Ayson states, “Stability, like peace, is a desired goal, but 
countries differ on what constitutes stability.”8 This study defines stability as the region’s 
“tendency toward equilibrium, including its ability to find a new equilibrium in changing 
conditions,” including “the avoidance of major war, the stability of distribution of power, 
the stability of institutions and norms, [and] political stability within countries.”9  
The Asia-Pacific region is the “system” for which this study attempts stability 
analysis, but the interrelationship of each country within the Asia-Pacific region is 
outside the scope of this work. For example, while domestic political dynamics within the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might impact Japan’s security environment, this study 
only needs to determine that the source of stability is external to Japan. This analysis 
includes the influence that the United States exerts on the region.  
Determining structural changes within the regional balance of power may prompt 
an equilibrium shift. The rise of China, with its expansive military modernization and 
economic expansion, appears to require other regional actors to find a new equilibrium. 
This thesis compares economic and military data between regional powers to determine if 
                                                 
8 Robert Ayson, “Regional Stability in the Asia Pacific: Toward a Conceptual Understanding,” Asian 
Security 1, no. 2 (2005): 190–213, doi: 10.1080/14799850490961080. 
9 Ayson, “Regional Stability in Asia Pacific,” 192. 
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changes in the balance of power have occurred vis-à-vis other regional actors. 
Demographically, it entails comparing population trends. Given the prominence of 
contested islands within regional disputes, the likelihood that conflicts would involve a 
significant maritime components, and current concerns about anti-access technologies 
within East Asia, this paper expands upon the metrics traditionally used by offensive 
realists.10 While the defense budget is included, paramilitary activity must also be 
considered because of the proliferation of white-hull fleets and the unorthodox behavior 
of those vessels within the past decade. For example, U.S. carrier forces have continued 
decrease relatively over recent years, as China has launched its first carrier, and started a 
program to create future indigenous carriers. Another U.S. intervention in cross-Strait 
tensions, like that of 1996 via two carrier strike groups, may be a riskier prospect in the 
future. The United States still has a significant maritime advantage vis-à-vis the PRC, but 
China’s development of technology, such as the DF-21D missile, could “prepare” China 
“for a foreign enemy’s military intervention” in future “anti-secessionist” conflicts with 
Taiwan.11 Eight years of DPP rule in Taiwan and 10 years of liberal coalition (LC) rule in 
Korea allow enough of a period to discern a pattern, but the DPJ was only in power in 
Japan for three years. This weakness in explanatory power means that Chapter II relies 
more on a detailed analysis of policy prescriptions and changes in defense policies to 
ascertain whether they made a difference. 
Balance of power calculations provides a foundation for understanding security 
dynamics, but does not explain the entirety of the security environment. Mearsheimer 
concludes that China’s rise will inevitably lead to conflict; in this view, elected 
governments in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, regardless of party, would make similar 
decisions when faced with external threats. The inevitability of conflict results from 
China’s rise and America’s attempt to contain it, along with a balancing coalition of 
“India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and 
                                                 
10 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 2003). 
11 M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-
Intervention,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 171–87, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002164. 
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Vietnam.”12 While this claim seems sensational, is a comparable NATO type institution 
starting to form in East Asia? Lanteigne makes the case that soft balancing is occurring 
within Asia, which would look more like bilateral and multilateral cooperation in light of 
China’s rise.13  
The amount and quality of institutions and alliance affiliations that countries share 
matter deeply in the decisions they will make regarding war. An alliance between two 
states makes a military dispute “40% less likely,” while being a player in the global 
decision-making process may constrain a country from going to war due to the potential 
of being ostracized by the international community.14 As institutional membership and 
alliances matter in regional stability, this thesis analyzes the nature of alliance relations to 
determine whether a country’s foreign policy decisions stabilized or destabilized the 
region. 
Democratization, democratic consolidation, and domestic politics are all 
phenomena that can produce uncontrollable forces; moreover, the impact of the resultant 
forces can lead to new (and sometimes unwanted) foreign policy conditions. Mansfield 
and Snyder note that instability, independent of either political party, tends to be 
associated with the rise of nationalism during democratization.15 Different from general 
political infighting within democratic countries, it reflects the more generic shift toward 
allowing new groups to compete for power, which heightens nationalism and 
significantly increases the potential for conflicts with outside countries.16 Since Taiwan 
and South Korea had only been a democracy for two election cycles prior to the 
opposition party’s coming to power, the effects of new democratization and fear of 
                                                 
12 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–
62, ProQuest: 200776171. 
13 Marc Lanteigne, “Water Dragon? China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in the South Pacific,” 
Political Science 64, no. 1 (June 2012): 36, doi: 10.1177/0032318712447732. 
14 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and 
International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001). 
15 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International 
Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5–38, JSTOR: 2539213. 
16 Ibid. 
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backsliding back into authoritarianism were still a concern. Japan’s democracy, by 
contrast, can be seen as very stable and longstanding, since the LDP has competed and 
won in regular elections for over 60 years.  
One question of importance to scholars of democratization is whether Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan were democratically consolidated in the first place at the time 
former-opposition parties gained power.17 A country can, as Japan did, have an 
apparently vibrant democracy for decades without meeting the full consolidation criteria. 
Once properly consolidated, issues pertaining to governance, instead of patronage and 
nationalism, predominate the political agenda, but some scholars believe that for 
complete consolidation, a functioning two-party system must exist.18 Some scholars, such 
as Cho, have found reason to believe that the democratic peace theory does not apply to 
countries that have not yet fully consolidated.19 His concern is relevant to the current 
thesis to the extent that any regional instability might be caused by a country’s 
incomplete democratic consolidation, a condition mostly independent of the particular 
party in power. 
Even if considering that a country is fully consolidated democracy, gridlock and 
opposition may still significantly constrain the ruling party’s ability to govern in an 
effective manner. If politics can constrain the amount of change a party can make, Japan 
should provide a rich example due to its ministerial government style and its reliance on 
coalition maintenance to govern. South Korea and Taiwan have presidential democracies, 
but government inaction is still possible given the possibility of a divided government 
between legislative and executive branches, alongside the potential that bureaucratic 
inertia can stifle a new administration’s initiatives. 
                                                 
17 Il Hyun Cho, “Democratic Instability: Democratic Consolidation, National Identity and Security 
Dynamics,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2011): 191–213, doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00154. 
18 Cho, “Democratic Instability,” 196. 
19 Cho, “Democratic Instability,” 209. 
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Ideas of threat and security are said to be socially constructed. How a country 
views anarchy, not anarchy itself, shapes its relations toward other countries.20 To 
determine party change and whether the ideas it generated were a determining factor in 
changes to regional stability, this paper traces sources of interstate tension between major 
regional actors to determine whether the new party played a role in promoting or 
endorsing destructive ideas for political gain. One major trend that has become 
troublesome in East Asia is rising nationalism among the many neighboring countries. At 
first glance, opposition parties in South Korea and Taiwan have either supported or 
pursued ideas and policies that eroded regional stability in this regard, while Japan’s 
traditional opposition party has opposed the strong nationalist thread that has stirred up 
discontent among its neighbors in recent years. This work seeks to incorporate ideas into 
its analysis mainly because anti-Japanese sentiment puts South Korea and Japan on an 
unnecessarily hostile trajectory while Taiwan’s increasingly felt Taiwanese identity has 
put it on a collision course with China. 
The author now turns to the major literature regarding Japan in particular. Hughes 
observes that the DPJ’s failure to implement its “new grand strategy” was due to the 
amount of pressure exerted by the international system, specifically China and the United 
States.21 Also, the lack of experience and domestic political issues helped to block 
progress on the DPJ’s attempt to become more regionally accepted. Sneider explains that 
U.S. alliance pressures posed significant domestic issues for Hatoyama and that his 
promotion of “Asianism” was misunderstood by U.S. policy makers.22 Each of these 
works focuses on different institutional characteristics that boxed in Japanese decision 
makers. While Sneider tends to give the DPJ more benefit of the doubt, Hughes blames 
the Hatoyama administration for the lack of experience and failure to govern 
                                                 
20 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” International Organization 46, no. 2 
(1992): 391–425, JSTOR: 2706858. 
21 Christopher W. Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (but Failing) Grand Security 
Strategy: From ‘Reluctant Realist’ to ‘Resentful Realist’?,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 38, no. 1 
(2012): 109–40, doi:10.1352/jjs.2012.0006.  
22 Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of 
Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 99–129, doi:10.1353/asp.2011.0016. 
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effectively.23 Hughes acknowledges the political infighting between the DPJ and Japan’s 
LDP, as well as bureaucratic rigidity, which contributed to souring relations with the 
United States.24 Pekkanen, Reed, and Scheiner note that the LDP’s strong opposition 
greatly affected the DPJ’s ability to govern.25 Together, this literature paints a grim 
picture of the constraints arrayed against the DPJ administration’s attempts to effect 
change in Japan. 
Another set of literature discusses the DPJ’s failure to govern during the 3/11 
crises and the diplomatic row over nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoutai Islands.26 
While the LDP, which failed to hold nuclear regulators accountable for decades, might 
not have handled the Fukushima triple disaster any better, Krauss makes an important 
point about the DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama’s stance on the Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma. His political jockeying unnecessarily reignited domestic conflict, which is still 
to be fully resolved.27 Richard Samuels discusses domestic and international 
considerations that have shaped Japan’s politics from the end of WWII until 2006, but 
does not cover the period that this analysis covers, 2009 to the present.28 The author’s 
analysis attempts to add to Samuels’ comprehensive political analysis for the three 
historic years of DPJ rule and beyond. 
In South Korea, the literature notes KDJ’s initial effective handling of the Asian 
financial crisis (AFC), as well as Korea’s fall back into predation.29 Political constraints 
kept KDJ from reforming the developmental state collaboration between the Chaebol and 
the government bureaucracy that has led to corruption. While not directly related to 
                                                 
23 Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (but Failing) Grand Security Strategy,” 109. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner, eds., “Japanese Politics between the 2009 
and 2012 Elections,” in Japan Decides 2012 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8–19. 
26 Ellis Krauss, “Crisis Management, LDP, and DPJ Style,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, 
no. 2 (2013): 177–99, doi:10.1017/S1468109913000029; Taniguchi, “Ishihara and the Senkakus.” 
27 Krauss, “Crisis Management,” 193-4 
28 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007). 
29 Dwight H. Perkins, East Asian Development: Foundations and Strategies (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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security, it highlights the potential that Kim had to make a difference. Moon and Suh 
write that Kim’s policies of thawing South Korea’s relationship with Japan were 
constrained by three factors: collective Korean identity that stems from “historic memory 
of colonial domination,” nationalist abuse of history in both Japan and South Korea, and 
in the opposite direction, the U.S.’ support for South Korea and Japan’s cooperation.30 
Moon and Suh focus on some of Kim administration’s positive accomplishments and the 
ideational and international constraints that affected Kim’s ability to make progress on 
democratic reforms or dismantling the developmental state; however, they focus only on 
one administration, not party change, in assessing the contribution of changes in 
government control to regional stability. Katherine Moon argues that nationalism and the 
anti-Americanism in Korea is part of the consolidation process of foreign policy within 
democratic principles, and it is natural and healthy for consolidating democracies.31 Both 
KDJ and RMH featured anti-American sentiment in their administration and presidential 
campaign, respectively, but Roh began to backpedal on anti-American sentiment after he 
was elected.32 Both the Cha and Moon analyses are useful for understanding ideological 
motivations that fueled RMH’s increasingly nationalistic campaign, but neither study 
focuses on the question of whether KDJ’s or RMH’s presidencies made a difference. In 
contrast, Zhu notes that President Roh’s “peace and prosperity policy” was vital in 
balancing South Korea’s alliance with the United States with its ability to help stabilize 
Northeast Asia.33 Haggard and Nolan determine that, although Roh’s peace and 
prosperity plan sounded productive, he had very little good will among his neighbors to 
achieve any of his lofty goals; for example, the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement 
(FTA) was being discussed as Koreans took to the streets to protest American beef.34 
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This study further assesses whether progressive presidents Kim and Roh actually made an 
appreciable difference.  
Taiwan, which is isolated from many international organizations and treaty 
alliances because of its peculiar status vis-à-vis China, is considered by the PRC to be a 
domestic issue, but is still accorded assurances that the Taiwan issue will be settled 
peacefully under the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques. Rigger 
notes that “Chen undertook a series of initiatives aimed at raising Taiwan’s international 
status: promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues related to 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, filing an application for United Nations membership for 
‘Taiwan.’”35 It is clear that Chen Shui-bian’s administration attempted unilaterally to 
change Taiwan’s international profile in an attempt to acquire more of the trappings of 
other independent countries. Furthermore, division within the government proved to be a 
problem for Chen. As Rigger notes, “For seven years, the KMT-dominated Legislative 
Yuan refused to appropriate funds to purchase most of what the United States was willing 
to sell.”36 This division had the effect of further deteriorating the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship. Yet, deteriorating relations may not have clearly been caused by Chen Shui-
bian’s actions. Although Chen pushed for referenda and other measures that attempted 
unilaterally to change the status quo to provide Taiwan more international recognition, 
his initial tone toward China was not nearly as radical. Taiwan’s new DPP party leader 
and president, Tsai Ing-wen, has also moderated the party’s stance on independence. 
Independence is still a contentious part of the party plank, but it has not been a part of her 
political message.37 Certain other pressures, such as domestic PRC concerns and relative 
balance of power change between China and the United States, might also factor into the 
interactions amongst the United States, China, and Taiwan from 2000–2008. 
Finally, each chapter of this thesis reviews whether the former, opposition party 
administrations, as opposed to other phenomena, ultimately have any effect on regional 
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stability. Cho provides intriguing findings about each country’s nationalist outbidding 
politics and democratic institutional structures.38 His work holds that a major caveat to 
the democratic peace theory is consolidation,39 and it furthers Mansfield and Snyder’s 
research on how democratization might lead to aggressive foreign policies and potential 
for war.40 While addressing some potential political constraints, Cho’s article argues that 
the lack of democratic consolidation and the “political salience” of negative nationalism 
resulted in nationalistic outbidding.41 As a consequence of its focus on democratic 
consolidation and the influence of ideas, the article does not attempt to address what 
difference, if any, a new political party can make in bringing stability to the region. That 
topic, however, is the intent of this thesis. 
In light of initial political party changes within Japan and South Korea, as well as 
Taiwan, this thesis analyzes how and whether changes to long-standing political control 
among East Asian democracies can affect regional stability within the Asia-Pacific. By 
focusing on phenomena that have traditionally led to conflict or tension in the region—
balance of power changes, alliance troubles, and ideas like nationalism and identity—the 
succeeding chapters narrow down ways that each country’s new administration might 
have contributed to instability. Typically, a confluence of multiple factors governs 
instability interdependently, but this thesis tries to distinguish between the effects of 
external factors, the actual policies and actions of the president or prime minister, and 
other domestic factors. This thesis finds that new administrations in Japan, and Korea, did 
negatively impact regional stability in certain ways, but that this instability seemed to be 
transient at best. It also finds that new administrations are significantly constrained from 
implementing changes due to a confluence of international and domestic forces that tend 
to reinforce the status quo. 
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These findings are important because the United States has rebalanced to the 
Pacific to protect its national interests, address concerns from allies about the rise of 
China, and ensure that the conflictual nature of the East China Sea (ECS) and South 
China Sea (SCS) disputes do not escalate into violence. The countries studied in this 
thesis have very close relationships with the United States. South Korea and Japan are 
both strong regional allies. Taiwan does not share a formal alliance with the United 
States, but benefits from military sales and an ambiguous security commitment that 
appears to guarantee that the cross-Strait dispute will be settled peacefully to some. If 
domestic politics in these countries destabilize the region, the United States could find 
itself entangled in a regional conflict.  
This study also tries to understand whether something is uniquely destabilizing 
about these East Asian cases. Multiple scholars have pointed out that countries in Asia 
seem not to follow the democratic peace theory as closely as other regions do, and by 
looking closer at Japan and South Korea, this thesis attempts to unpack these claims 
while providing an explanatory framework to put different sources of instability into 
perspective. Besides providing a new lens from which to judge whether domestic 
phenomena will affect international relations (IR) among a region’s many dynamic 
actors, it is the author’s hope that this work clarifies some of the challenges facing 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region and what should be expected during future iterations 
of administration in democracies in that region. 
Two main chapters, beside the introduction and conclusion, focus on Japan and 
South Korea. Each contains a section on how and whether instability within the regional 
security environment corresponded to periods of opposing party rule. These initial 
sections for each country are subdivided into three functional areas: changes to regional 
balance of power, changes in alliances, and ideological currents that impact stability. The 
second section of each chapter analyzes each area in which the first section found areas 
of instability and filters the sources of this instability into three causal areas: international 
constraints or sources of friction, policies and actions solely attributable to the 
administration, and other domestic constraints and sources of friction. 
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This thesis focuses on historical accounts, using mostly secondary sources. Minor 
data sets are used to analyze military spending numbers and economic indicators. 
Furthermore, polling data from primary and secondary sources, when it appeared to be 
trustworthy,  was used to measure change in ideas, such as nationalism or identity. 
This thesis measures the effects on regional stability through two components, 
severity and persistence. While a significant event, such as an invasion of another 
country, is extremely severe, it may or may not be a persistent source of instability, 
depending on whether occupation occurs and whether hostilities diminish or persist 
afterward. On the other hand, historical contestation over an uninhabited rock can rise to 
a level of dispute that poisons diplomatic relations between countries for decades, but 
does not result in military conflict, which would constitute persistent but not severe 
instability. The measurements of the first section consider the persistence and severity of 




Japan has had a single dominant party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rule 
the country almost without interruption through six decades of peace and prosperity. 
Within the past 10 years, a true opposition party, The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 
has not only materialized, but for the first time also won control of the Diet and appointed 
a prime minister with no coalition support from the LDP. During the DPJ’s three years of 
rule from 2009 to 2012, three prime ministers, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda 
Yoshihiko attempted to make large changes that appeared to destabilize the region in a 
number of key ways. This chapter focuses on those years of 2009 through 2012 to 
determine whether or not the DPJ destabilized the region, or whether it made a difference 
at all. 
The first section introduces the regional trends in play and how they affect Japan. 
These macro-level trends include balance of power considerations that affect long-term 
regional stability, alliance maintenance with regional actors, and identity shifts that affect 
Japan’s image abroad. Each subsection helps to determine the overall instability that 
Japan’s interaction with the regional system has produced. 
The second section attributes the instability to external pressures, internal political 
pressures other than those driven by the DPJ, or to the policies that the DPJ itself 
implemented (or failed to implement). The section further is divided into four 
subsections: regional leadership, history issues, territorial disputes, and base issues. The 
regional leadership subsection analyzes Japan’s attempts to instill a sense of regional 
institutionalization in East Asia to counter China’s rise. The history issues subsection 
discusses whether or not the DPJ was able to overcome Japan’s perceived failure to 
acknowledge historical atrocities it committed during WWII. The territorial disputes 
section addresses how Japan has attempted to deal with islands over which it disputes 
sovereignty with China, Taiwan, and Korea. Finally, base issues are a significant strain to 
U.S.-Japanese relations and have the potential to morph into a regional issue.  
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Many scholars have warned that democratization, incomplete consolidation, and 
other transitional phenomena related to democracies can lead to instability or conflict.42 
Japan’s initial attempt to democratize was the Taisho Democracy of the WWI era.43 This 
experiment did not last, as the Japanese Imperial Army assassinated politicians who got 
in its way, with the military eventually taking over the prime minister’s position.44 After 
Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) 
implemented the post-war constitution, which has persisted unchanged since. But even as 
the Japanese government hosted free and fair elections, the LDP’s conservative 
predecessors, and then the LDP itself since 1955, have maintained a monopoly on 
power.45 In the 1990s, the bubble burst, and Japan’s economy experienced what some 
have called the lost decades.46 The LDP’s failure to shore up a spiraling economy while 
also dealing with political scandals resulted in party fragmentation and its first loss of 
power. The first instance of LDP defeat occurred from 1993–1994, when a coalition of 
eight parties, led by Hosokawa Morihiro, ruled for less than a year before the coalition 
disintegrated.47 This study does not include this period for two reasons. First, the parties 
in power were not in power long enough to provide useful data on regional stability. 
Second, the Hosokawa government’s main policy effort focused on electoral reform and 
other internal matters, not security or foreign policy. Directly after Hosokawa’s 
successor, Tsutomo Hata, took office, the coalition’s rule was ended through a vote of no 
                                                 
42 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democracy and Danger”; Amitav Acharya, “Democracy or Death? Will 
Democratization Bring Greater Regional Instability to East Asia,” The Pacific Review 23, no. 3 (2010): 
335–58, doi:10.1080/09512748.2010.481052; Cho, “Democratic Instability.” 
43 Takayoshi Matsuo, “The Development of Democracy in Japan—Taisho Democracy: Its Flowering 
and Breakdown—,” The Developing Economies 4, no. 4 (1966): 612–32, doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.1966.tb 
00495.x. 
44 Conrad Shirokauer and Donald N. Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2008). 
45 Gerald L. Curtis, “The Liberal Democratic Party: Perpetuating Dominance,” in The Japanese Way 
of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 45–79. 
46 Perkins, East Asian Development, 154–55. 
47 Gerald L. Curtis, “The Politics of Complacency,” in The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, 
Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 25–64. 
 17
confidence.48 The LDP then coopted the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) by promising it the 
position of prime minister if the JSP would help the LDP form a ruling coalition. Thus, 
Tomiichi Murayama of the JSP became prime minister, but supported by a majority-LDP 
ruling coalition. The JSP’s power sharing agreement with the LDP was unique to 
domestic politics. It accomplished multiple breakthroughs in regional diplomacy, but 
citizens had not given majority support to Murayama’s party in the way they did to 
Hatoyama’s DPJ. Also, the traditional ruling party, the LDP, was not actively impeding 
the JSP’s attempt to rule. The period that Murayama ruled, 1994–1996, was thus 
essentially not a non-LDP government. It may deserve study in and of itself, but this 
study aims to examine the first time that a traditional opposition party was installed by 
the people. For this reason, it focuses on the period of 2009–2012 to determine whether 
the non-LDP governments make a difference.  
A. EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Japan appears to have filled the role of Perfidious Albion of East Asia. Its position 
of offshore balancer almost mirrors that of Great Britain, including an even greater 
resentment and hostility toward it by its continental neighbors. Japan’s history includes 
the brutal occupations of Korea, and parts of China during the early 1900s, which 
continue to haunt relations with its neighbors today.49 Although its economic might had 
increased exponentially from the 1950s through the 1980s, Japan’s bubble burst in the 
1990s, which resulted in a stultification of growth.50 Also, Japan’s close relations with 
America allowed Japan’s constrained military to take advantages of the high technology 
that the West was implementing. The past two decades have greatly diminished Japan’s 
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economic and military lead over traditional adversaries like China and have allowed 
Korea to close the gap slightly. This situation matters inasmuch as the three countries still 
maintain disputes over islands stemming from an incomplete understanding of the 
Potsdam Agreement and Treaty of San Francisco that ended WWII and repatriated land 
back to countries that Japan had historically conquered in the 20th century.51 As the past 
two decades have seen absolute increases in military spending, Japan’s 1% defense 
spending cap has not hobbled its ability to expand the Japanese Self Defense Force’s 
(JSDF’s) capabilities. While the PRC has surpassed Japan in the quantity of most military 
units, including ships, aircraft, and armored divisions, the quality of Japan’s military 
surpasses most regional powers with little exception. If the JSDF is lacking in any area, it 
would be its level of tactical experience. 
1. Balance of Power 
Japan’s constrained military is a difficult factor in a stressful geostrategic 
environment in which it actively disputes territory with Russia, Korea, and China while 
concerned about North Korean nuclear provocation and random acts of aggression. Its 
security gap had been filled by subsidizing the American military presence, but it 
continues to worry both about being either abandoned by Washington during its time of 
need or being entangled in America’s various adventures around the world, such as 
Koizumi’s deployment of self-defense forces (SDF) forces into Iraq.52 
South Korea is half the size of Japan based on population, spends approximately 
half as much as Japan on its military, and continues to maintain an economic gap with 
Tokyo regarding its latent power capabilities. Both countries are manufacturing 
powerhouses with a penchant for high technology and innovation, and both have 
purchased some of the most technologically advanced weapon systems from the United 
States to bolster their defense posture. While potential exists for the two nations to work 
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together on issues like ballistic missile defense, they also have an interesting chance to be 
locked into conflict regarding the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands.53 In 2005, Japan’s Shimane 
prefecture established “Takeshima Day” to celebrate annexation. This move increased the 
tension between Japan and Korea and led to a “near miss” in 2006 when South Korean 
President Roh Moo-hyun (RMH) dispatched 20 Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) ships 
to seize two Japanese Coast Guard survey vessels. As shown in Table 1, Korea spent 
roughly one-third as much as Japan on its defense in 2004, but Japan’s almost steady 
levels of spending for over a decade, coupled with ROK increases, have resulted in a 
narrower but still-significant divide in military spending: one-half in 2014. Investment in 
submarines and other maritime equipment can be seen as presenting a problem for Tokyo 
over reaching a settlement on the disputed islets. 
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Table 1.   Japan Military Spending54 
 
 
China surpassed Japan in military spending in 2003 and has increased its spending 
threefold over the last decade.55 While Japan and China are economically intertwined, 
they remain locked in a bitter dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China’s military 
modernization has exacerbated the problem by setting a shipbuilding pace that Japan 
could not afford to match even if it chose to do so. To maintain a semblance of parity 
between the two, Japan has used its white-hulled Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to police 
the Senkaku Islands. This move is important, because it may appear to be a de-escalatory 
measure, but it might represent more of a budgetary necessity than a confidence-building 
measure. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), like the rest of Japan’s  
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de facto military, is limited in the Diet by a 1% spending cap. To circumvent this cap, the 
Kantei, or Office of the Prime Minister, has started funding national security programs 
outside the defense budget.56 For example, Japan’s cost incurred for basing U.S. forces in 
Japan is considered outside of the defense budget. Also, the JCG is considered separate, 
and, therefore, a significant increase in JCG ships has augmented the traditional gray-
hulled JMSDF ships.57 This measure has been reciprocated by China’s paramilitary sea 
service, the Chinese Coast Guard, in recent years, and China has surpassed all other 
countries combined in the number of ships in its Navy and Coast Guard.58 
Another method that Japan has attempted to manage the risk of China’s rise is to 
hug the United States close and reach out to other like-minded states throughout East 
Asia. In the previous decade, Japan has successfully strengthened relations with India, 
Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and a host of other countries.59 Recently, by 
providing military assistance and conducting presence operations in the South China Sea, 
Japan has disbursed its resources around the East and South China Seas to divide China’s 
resources while attempting to address differences with Beijing in a constructive 
manner.60 
North Korea provides a real but somewhat inflated risk to Japan.61 While the LDP 
magnify the risk of DPRK nuclear attack, Japan currently possesses redundancy for 
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countering North Korea’s inchoate ballistic missile threat. Japan has experienced DPRK 
small boat attacks and a string of kidnappings that only surfaced when Prime Minister 
Koizumi met with Kim Jong-Il on September 17, 2002.62 Although it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for North Korea to project any substantial force ashore against Japan, 
this threat does not assuage Tokyo’s concern over the North’s abundant stockpiles of 
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, its robust asymmetric forces, and cyber 
capabilities that pose a risk to Japan’s security. 
Japan and Russia have never signed a peace treaty formally ending WWII, but 
this does not translate into the ill will experienced between Japan and North Korea. 
Generally, Japan has been viewed as an American proxy in the Far East and one of 
Russia’s adversaries during the Cold War. Further back, the Russian Empire’s collapse 
can be partly attributed to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, in which Japan surprised 
much of the world by taking on and defeating the Russian juggernaut.63 The two still 
have unsettled business. The Russian-administered Southern Kurile Islands are still 
claimed by Japan and referred to within Japan as the Northern Territories.64 In 2010, 
President Medvedev visited the disputed islands and called for its Russian defenses to be 
increased.65  
Russia’s other concern is that Japan controls two of the three straits going in and 
out of Russia’s only Far East naval base in Vladivostok and can contest the third. The Le 
Perouse straits, or Soya Kaikyo in Japanese, border Russia in the north and Japan in the 
south. The other two straits, the Tsugaru Straits between Hokkaido and Honshu and 
Tsushima Straits between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Islands of Tsushima 
and Honshu, pose a geostrategic concern for Russian defense of its east coast. 
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Tokyo seems little worried about Russia’s increase in military spending even 
though Russia’s defense spending surpassed Japan’s in 2004 and continued climbing.66 
Perhaps one reason that Japan and Russia have openly worked with each other since the 
end of the Cold War is that they perceive China’s rise as a common threat. Another 
reason that Tokyo has not sounded any alarms over Russia’s actions is that Moscow’s 
attention has been focused on the West in recent decades: Georgia, Crimea and the 
Ukraine, and now Syria.67 While Japan has followed the Western sanction regime against 
Russia for its breach of other countries’ sovereignty, Tokyo’s interests were not directly 
at stake. With the exception of the Northern Territories, and Japan’s adoption of 
sanctions against Russia for its aggressions in Europe, a similar pragmatism exists that 
underpins relations and has benefited both countries economically. 
America’s security commitment to Japan is based on the Treaty of San Francisco 
and the United States’ role in drafting Japan’s war-renouncing Constitution, but as U.S. 
forces become spread thin throughout the world, Japan grows increasingly concerned 
about whether its stalwart ally has the wherewithal to stay the course.68 In a regional 
context, America’s presence provided security for East Asia’s miracle growth.69 East 
Asian countries are sometimes viewed as wanting the benefit of American presence and 
security assurance without having to contribute, either in military might or in basing 
agreements. But Japan has disproportionately paid for the quartering of troops in East 
Asia. One reason this makes sense is that Japan has disproportionately benefited from 
America’s security assurance. 
Japan has benefited from the American military presence while quietly 
subsidizing the bill. Japan’s defense spending has remained relatively low, less than 1% 
of its gross domestic product (GDP) since WWII. While this still translates into  
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Japan constantly landing among the top five to 10 countries in overall defense spending, 
it is still far less than other countries based on its economic potential.70 To compensate 
for its paucity in “military spending,” Japan spends a considerable amount on the 
operating costs of American bases. Calder notes that Japan contributed four to  
five trillion dollars annually for the expenses incurred from hosting approximately  
40,000 U.S. personnel within Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s.71 All in all, 
Japan’s relatively light investment has, over the decades, allowed it to invest more 
domestically. 
2. Allies and Trade Relations 
In progressing from the mortal enemies to the closest of allies, the U.S. and Japan 
forged an alliance post-WWII that has served both countries’ interests since. After WWII, 
and the end of the U.S. military occupation of Japan, the two countries signed a security 
agreement and the Treaty of San Francisco. These have been the foundation of America’s 
security assurance as well as the raison d’etre for American military presence in Japan 
today. Japan benefited by investing in its economy instead of its security apparatus. In 
return, America has benefited from trade with Japan and enjoyed a stable place from 
which to project power into the region. 
Early spats arose on both sides, but the relationship has weathered 65 years intact. 
America continued its control over the Okinawan Island group until 1972, despite the 
anger of some Japanese citizens, who felt that parts of Japan were still occupied by the 
U.S. military. However, forging the alliance also led to Prime Minister Kishi’s 
resignation in 1960 and a cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit the same year. 
Japan’s economic growth started to apply pressure the other way by the 1970s, when the 
Japanese trade imbalance and influx of cheap manufacturing goods put pressures on 
American manufacturing companies. After numerous attempts to control the problem 
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with quotas and other methods, the two countries finally resolved the issue of Japan’s 
undervalued currency at the Plaza Accords in 1985.72  
U.S.-Japan relations hit a rough patch again in the late 2000s with the 
reemergence of the Okinawa base issue and the cessation of Japan’s Indian Ocean 
refueling mission, but relations have since grown stronger. Pressure to close Marine 
Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma led to the agreement to relocate to Henoko in 2006. 
National and domestic politics have shaped the move plans, and legal battles and protests 
continue to slow progress to this day.73 Midford notes, “The United States supposedly 
cancelled some bilateral working level meetings in retaliation” for Japan’s indecision on 
the Henoko relocation.74 Japan’s contribution to America’s Global War on Terror, 
meanwhile, had involved refueling missions in the Indian Ocean since 2001. In 2009, the 
DPJ unilaterally ended the refueling mission, a move popular within Japan.75 In 2011, 
American forces stood next to Japanese forces as they dealt with the aftermath of the 3/11 
triple disaster. Also, former Secretary of State Clinton, since 2010, provided the strongest 
reassurances for defending Japan against attacks that include the disputed Senkaku 
Islands. In the strongest move that Japan could have made to take up an equal footing to 
its American alliance partner, Prime Minister Abe reinterpreted Article 9 of the 
Constitution to permit collective self-defense.76 At the time of this writing, the United 
States and Japan have as close relations as they have had at any time in the past.  
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Sino-Japanese relations have oscillated between periods of economic cooperation 
and periods of hostility since formal recognition was shifted to the PRC. After Japan 
recognized the PRC as the official government of “one China” in the 1970s, the two 
countries increased trade relations; China has been Japan’s largest trading partner since 
2005.77 This does not mean, however, that the relationship can be considered good. The 
two countries manage the complicated relationship to benefit both economically. While 
Tokyo has sought to work with Beijing, Japan’s accounting of history, friction over the 
Senkaku Islands, and other issues have roiled relations time and again. Besides its past 
occupation of China, Japan also has had trouble breaking the ice with China because of 
Japan’s support for the Korean War, official recognition of Taiwan until 1972, and 
implementation of economic sanctions against Beijing after the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre in 1989. 
More recently, trade has continued to grow while disputes over history and the 
Senkaku Islands came to the forefront. In 2008, Prime Minister Aso Taro visited Beijing 
and President Hu Jintao visited Tokyo. A feeling of thawing relations would only be 
superficial, though. In 2010, China protested vociferously when Japan arrested a Chinese 
fisherman near the Senkaku Islands.78 Both sides started increasing their presence in and 
around the Senkaku islands. In 2012, Ishihara Shintaro attempted to purchase the 
islands.79 In response, DPJ Prime Minister Kan nationalized the islands. This 
nationalization led to widespread protests in the streets of China and an increased 
aggressiveness by the Chinese paramilitary and People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF), including one incident in which a Chinese ship locked on a Japanese vessel 
with its fire control RADAR.80 China then declared an ECS Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) in 2013, which only increased fighter sorties and led to dangerous 
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aerobatics that has left both sides close to conflict on several of occasions.81 China’s rise 
has pushed Japan into a position in which it must balance against Beijing. The idea of 
Japanese “Asianism,” which Hatoyama hoped would bring peace into the region, was 
replaced with “proactive Pacifism,” through which Prime Minister Abe has also 
considered Japan’s Asian neighbors, but carefully selected which neighbors to ally with 
to balance against Chinese assertiveness.82 Neither side appears to be backing down from 
an increasingly tense geostrategic game of chicken. 
South Korea and Japan share relations that can best be described as complex and 
multifaceted. Japan’s brutal occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the early 20th century 
continues to cloud relations between these two advanced democracies within East Asia. 
In the 1950s, Japan provided material support for the South and the United States for 
during the Korean War. Japan has also provided economic aid to the South in the 1960s 
in lieu of reparations.83 Although Korea had robust trade relations with Japan, numerous 
flare-ups over the Korean-administered Dokdo Islands—administration of which is 
contested Japan, which calls them Takeshima—and anger over what many consider 
Japan’s attempt to “whitewash” history, continue to plague bilateral progress. 
Kim Dae-jung and Koizumi Junichiro held the Joint Asian Cup in 2002 while 
trying to work through historical issues as separate matters.84 Relations soured in 2003 
when Roh Moo-hyun (RMH) adopted a populist style that strained relations with many of 
Korea’s neighbors and allies. Even after the potentially toxic combination of Koizumi 
and Roh transitioned into the next iteration of leaders, the dispute did not diminish. Japan 
reacted harshly when President Lee Myeung-bak (LMB) visited the Dokdo Islands in 
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2012 after the DPJ’s Kan administration refused to reconsider compensation for comfort 
women.85 Bilateral meetings between President Park Geun-hye (PGH) and Abe Shinzo 
finally occurred in November 2015, the first time since each took office in 2013 and 
2012, respectively.86 While some hold that relations between the two are thawing, hatred 
and distrust still exists among Korean citizens.87 Some progress has been made on 
military information-sharing agreements pertaining to the North Korean nuclear missile 
threat, but this progress should not be overstated. Senior leaders in the Korean 
government are conflicted over whether Japan poses an existential threat or is an 
important strategic partner, or perhaps, is a little bit of both.88 
Japan has increasingly reached out to countries in East Asia to build strategic 
partnerships and friendships, and to mitigate the risk of an assertive China. Japan’s 
provisioning and training of both the Philippine and Vietnamese Coast Guards is an 
example of Tokyo’s attempt to show regional leadership while simultaneously throwing a 
wrench into China’s CSC claims.89 India is another prominent partner that has been 
growing in importance. Relations between Japan and India have reached new heights 
under the Abe-Modi leadership, with some going as far as to label the budding diplomatic 
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relationship a “bromance.”90 As the geostrategic equilibrium shifts to accommodate for 
China’s new place in the regional balance of power, balancing coalitions continue to 
materialize slowly along China’s periphery.91 
3. Nationalism and Historical Revisionism 
Japan’s reconciliation after WWII has not gone well. Unlike Germany’s outward 
show of remorse, which was met by genuine forgiveness by its neighbors, Japan’s 
infrequent attempts at reconciliation have been shrugged off by several neighbors as 
insincere. One issue is that Japanese politicians, especially from the LDP, make 
insensitive or simply incorrect statements regarding Japan’s wartime history. Examples 
include attempts to gloss over the Nanjing Massacre and the forced sexual slavery of 
“comfort women.”92 The issue revolves around not only revisionism and nationalism 
within Japan, but also the nationalism that resonates in the PRC and Korea. 
Top-down historical revisionism is a political tool that East Asian countries use 
for domestic stability, diplomatic positioning, and rationalization of aggressive actions to 
achieve political objectives. China’s patriotic education accentuates the “century of 
humiliation” to distract from domestic issues since the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989.93 
South Korea’s anger about Japan’s historical occupation is usually triggered by disputes 
over the Dokdo Islands or reparations for “comfort women.”94 Unlike in China, the 
process in Korea seems to be a bottom-up phenomenon in which the Korean government 
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is driven by public opinion into harder positons than they would otherwise take. South 
Koreans sometimes hold Japan at fault for its nation remaining in pieces: it was Japan’s 
original sin that caused the bifurcation of the Joseon Kingdom into two. Without Japan’s 
invasion and subsequent occupation, the Soviet Union and America would have had no 
occasion to be in Korea.  
In Japan, elite opinion, more than the masses, exacerbates relations with the 
country’s neighbors. A majority of the Japanese population has disagreed with the 
revisionist line. Nippon Kaigi, a historical revisionist organization with significant 
influence, and groups like it, has advocated for “patriotic education” and the end of 
“masochistic versions of Japanese history.”95 Known for its advocacy of the Prime 
Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and its members’ getting arrested while 
attempting to travel to Dokdo, this group is disproportionately represented within the 
government, with 15 out of 19 members of Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet at one time 
being members of this organization.96 As in China, the revision of history does not keep 
confined to a small interest group. History textbooks have become one of the contested 
grounds for these nationalist organizations.97 
Measures have been proposed to fix these history issues once and for all, but these 
efforts for the most part have failed. In response to anger over historical textbooks, a 
group of historians from Japan, China, and South Korea attempted to create a common 
history textbook for all three countries. The group has little success in getting the book 
into schools for each of the countries. While Southeast Asia and the United States believe 
it is important for Japan to be cognizant of history, the same outpouring of criticism that 
is heard from China and Korea does not occur. Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
have all suffered under Japanese occupation, and each country has a more favorable view 
of Tokyo than does China and South Korea. Taiwan is also a partner to the Senkaku 
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disputes, but the difference between its cooperation with Japan and that of Beijing is as 
stark as the difference between night and day. This sentiment just puts into perspective 
how the complex interaction of nationalism and historical memory can confound 
relations in an already volatile region. 
B. ANALYSIS 
What accounts for the sense that the regional stability suffered during DPJ 
administrations? The DPJ faced great difficulty in trying to implement its strategy; 
fumbling with foreign policy issues, the three DPJ administrations failed to realize the 






















The average resulted in greater stability. 
The average resulted in negligible change in stability. 
The average resulted in less stability. 
Figure 1.  Japan Stability Analysis 
Hatoyama’s administration’s attempts to implement its strategy weakened his 
political capital while emboldening China and distancing the United States.98 This 
combination of forces was temporarily destabilizing. On the bright side, the DPJ’s stance 
on Japan’s official recognition of historic atrocities during WWII improved, at least while 
98 Krauss, “Crisis Management,” 186–8. 
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it held the office of prime minister. LDP Prime Minister Abe continues to struggle with 
some aspects of Japan’s wartime history, as evidenced by his standing up a committee to 
question the validity of the Kono Statement, as well as his changed behavior between his 
first and second administrations. Some progress appears to have been made. 
Territorial disputes provided a stumbling block over which the DPJ continually 
stumbled. Its time in power resulted in major incidents with the PRC over the Senkaku 
Islands, Lee Myeung-bak’s visit to the Dokdo Islands for the first time, Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to the Southern Kuriles for the first time, and the addition of 
missile systems to the disputed islands.  
Japan’s close ties with the United States suffered under the DPJ. Hatoyama’s 
antagonistic position toward the United States when it came to continued refueling 
support under Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean, the Futenma base issue, 
and his enunciation of the Yuai policy left policy makers in Washington scratching their 
heads. Fortunately, very little lasting enmity remains between Washington and Tokyo. 
The Futenma base issue is the only area in which the DPJ seems to have had a lasting 
effect, but the settlement of the Henoko relocation is slowly progressing.  
Security policies saw slow, incremental changes under the DPJ. The party 
actively supported enhanced institutionalization and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The backlash over 
Senkaku, Dokdo, and the Southern Kurile Islands during the DPJ administrations 
provided Prime Minister Abe a greater context to push for a reinterpretation of the 
constitution to allow collective self-defense. Thus, concerning military affairs, the DPJ 
changed little during its time in office, but the confidence that the Japanese people gained 
in the military after 3/11 and the realization that Japan lives in an increasingly dangerous 
neighborhood helped the next administration make monumental leaps that it was not able 
to make during Abe’s first administration. The following subsections assess the 
contributing factors to instances of heightened instability during DPJ administrations and 
attribute them either to external constraints, non-party-driven internal constraints, or DPJ 
policies and actions. 
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1. Yuai Policy 
DPJ attempts to improve Japan’s relations with China and South Korea failed, as 
both countries were less than cooperative. The LDP helped derail policy implementation 
as well. DPJ inexperience greatly contributed to its failure to implement the Yuai policy 
and mend relations with other East Asian countries. Tenants of the southwest shift policy 
may have influenced Abe’s success reaching out to India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
other countries in Asia. The DPJ’s lasting effect can at best be marginal in this field. 
The Yuai policy attempted to reinvigorate Japan’s relations with its neighbors and 
increasing its leadership within East Asia. Its manifesto states, “the DPJ will make the 
greatest possible effort to develop relations of mutual trust with China, South Korea and 
other Asian nations, and to strengthen the bonds of solidarity with Asian countries within 
the framework of the international community.”99 Unlike the nationalist Koizumi and 
Abe administrations, real potential seemed possible for defrosting relations with China 
and South Korea. As Hatoyama explained in 2009, “There are issues between Japan and 
China that need to be resolved through frank discussion: the historical issue and the 
territorial issue. Until we sit down and honestly discuss these issues, we can’t resolve 
them”100 Some of the loudest complaints from China and South Korea would be silenced 
as DPJ politicians would not make annual pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Interestingly enough, it appears that initial overtures for improved relationships would 
eventually turn into one of the most contentious periods of Sino-Japanese relations since 
the end of the Cold War. 
As amenable as the Yuai policy appeared to be on its face, it was not warmly 
received by China and South Korea. China was rightly concerned about Hatoyama’s 
ability to espouse ideas like fellowship while also pitching balancing coalitions to 
China’s neighbors. Hatoyama stated, “From Vietnam’s perspective, China is a real threat. 
Japan and Russia can cooperate to assist Vietnam’s development, in order to constrain 
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China or reduce the sense of threat that Vietnam feels.”101 Thus, not only do the usual 
concerns of historical insensitivity and territorial disputes worry Beijing, it would appear 
that Japan was actively attempting to multilateralize SCS disputes with countries on each 
of China’s borders. Even as strategic interdependence increased between the two, China’s 
military modernization continues to cause reactions that are wholly unsuitable to its 
leaders. China’s overreaction to Japan’s arresting a fisherman off the Senkaku Islands in 
2010 had less to do with Japan’s actions than China’s need to respond in a tough manner 
for the benefit of its domestic population.102 Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989, the CCP has inculcated a strain of nationalism that has actively exploited anti-
Japanese sentiment to motivate the Chinese population.103 Thus, China’s ability to 
overlook international incidents with Japan or its ease in achieving rapprochement with 
Japan is tempered by a CCP-fostered anti-Japanese atmosphere. One reason that 
Hatoyama was not able to make a breakthrough with Hu Jintao is that the history issue is 
a proxy for other issues that are more important to China, such as Japan’s role in enabling 
the U.S. presence in the region and the maritime dispute with Japan over the Senkaku 
Islands. The PRC uses this concern over Japan’s remilitarizing and the conservative 
leader’s inability to atone for past mistakes as a cudgel for beating Japan and rallying the 
support of its people. The DPJ’s naivety gave it false expectations of its chances with 
Chinese rapprochement.  
Japan’s relations with South Korea also failed to net the immediate returns that 
the DPJ wanted. Under the Koizumi-Roh administrations, relations dropped to their 
lowest point since the end of WWII.104 Again, unlike the overwhelming chorus, the 
Dokdo Islands dispute was the driver of angst between Japan and South Korea. The DPJ, 
unlike the LDP, showed real contrition in Japan’s WWII past, but this fact did not  
improve the relations between the two countries. During Prime Minister Noda’s 
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administration in 2012, LMB was pressed by his Constitutional Court to act on Japan 
regarding comfort women reparations. Noda appeared dismissive, and Lee became the 
first South Korean President to visit the Dokdo Islands, and for good measure, he also 
offended the Japanese emperor.105 This divergence in expectations came partly from the 
DPJ’s failure to read the tea leaves, but also from the domestic politics within Korea. 
With a negative nationalism still ebbing through the ROK, LMB attempted to sway the 
2013 elections by successfully appealing to the anti-Japanese sentiment within Korea. 
Japan also found it difficult to implement its Yuai policy because of domestic 
spoilers. The Senkaku Islands and the Dokdo Islands incidents generated an anti-Chinese 
and anti-Korean nationalism in Japan that was counterproductive to implementing the 
Yuai policy and threatened to boot the DPJ from power.106 Domestic political opposition 
is addressed in greater detail in the next sections. 
The DPJ’s lack of public relations skills and diplomacy experience contributed to 
its failures in foreign policy. Its mixed messages to China and failure to ascertain the real 
nature of each bilateral agreement led both China and South Korea to view the DPJ 
administrations as weak and feckless. As Pekkanen and Reed note, “Noda was the closest 
thing to Koizumi…the difference was in the way the two prime ministers handled the 
media: Koizumi was a master and Noda was a disaster.”107 This misperception resulted 
in increased chances for disputes to escalate. This apparent instability did not leave any 
irreparable damage, but it may have actually benefited Japan in a few unintended ways. 
Under Abe’s second administration, Japan has engaged with Vietnam, Australia, the 
Philippines, and other ASEAN countries.108 Abe’s administration has actively extended 
assurances to the Philippines that Japan will support Manila over the Spratly Island 
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disputes and Hanoi over the Paracel Islands disputes.109 Also, Abe’s second run in power 
has been less overtly revisionist than his previous go. While it is hard to say that the 
DPJ’s policies influenced him, the change that started in 2009 may help transform 
relations in ways that the DPJ could not. To say it another way, Abe’s ability not to visit 
Yasukuni, to give appropriate speeches for the 70th anniversary of WWII, and his deal to 
provide official reparations to the surviving “comfort women” may be the equivalent to a 
LDP’s “Nixon goes to China.” 
2. Territorial Disputes 
Under the DPJ, all three of Japan’s major territorial disputes erupted. Its disputes 
with three countries—China, South Korea, and Russia—deteriorated. Each country had 
its own diplomatic and domestic reasons to act provocatively during this period. Japanese 
domestic politics contributed to the building tension in ways that undermined the DPJ’s 
efforts. For the DPJ, it is not clear how it intended to resolve the territorial disputes in 
concert with its Yuai plan. Since it had been so forthright with all its other policy 
prescriptions, the reason the DPJ failed to resolve these disputes properly was more than 
likely due to its lack of a formulated policy and lack of governing experience. 
Two Senkaku incidents threw Japan’s rapprochement with China into a tailspin, 
clearly increasing tension with East Asia. The first incident occurred during the 
Hatoyama administration. A Chinese fishing vessel was detained for hitting a Japanese 
maritime patrol ship; the crew was returned, but the captain was arrested and held for 
10 days. China briefly severed relations with Japan over the incident, and stopped its 
shipments of rare earth minerals as well. Chinese patrol boats started appearing in greater 
numbers.  
Another aspect of the Senkaku Islands that brought it to international attention 
was the attempt of Ishihara Shintaro, then Governor of Tokyo, to purchase the islands 
from their owner. It has been a particularly durable escalation within the region when 
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combined with China’s actions of sending patrols into the contiguous waters of the 
Senkaku Islands,110 and unilaterally declaring an ADIZ over the ECSs in 2013 that 
includes the Senkaku Islands.111 Although a dispute occurred over to whom the islands 
belonged, and China and Japan reached a secret agreement, intensification started to 
occur before the initial 2010 fishing boat captain incident. Chinese patrols were a regular 
occurrence prior to the fisherman incident.112 
Japan and Korea’s dispute over the Dokdo Islands is only one major issue that 
drives South Koreans to petition their government for harsher treatment of Tokyo. In 
2005, Japan’s Shimane prefecture established Takeshima Day,113 a celebration that the 
Koreans see as celebrating Japan’s wartime conquest of the Korean Peninsula.114 The 
South has increased rhetoric and action since then with Roh Moo-hyun sending ROKN 
ships to intercept a Japanese survey mission in 2006.115 Even after Hatoyama attempted 
to decrease tension between both sides when he took office, problems between the two 
countries continued. In 2011, several LDP politicians were turned around in South Korea 
for attempting to access the Dokdo Islands.116 LMB declared that “Japan is no longer 
influential” as he prepared to step onto the disputed Dokdo Islands on August 10, 
2012.117 On November 11, 2010, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev visited the South 
Kuril Islands, which Japan calls the Northern Territories. He became the first Russian 
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President to visit the islands, during the Kan Naoto administration, which resulted in a 
similar response from Japan.118 
International pressures included the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), China, Russia, and Korea. The arrival of the DPJ did not lead to the 
sudden increase in maritime incidents, but rather the deadline for the submission of 
claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which caused a 
similar uptick in the SCS starting in 2009.119 When Japan arrested the ship captain in 
2010, Chinese citizens staged major protests.120 China detained four Japanese citizens for 
“security breaches.” Rare earth mineral shipments were stopped and a threatening speech 
was made against Japan as a result of its actions.121 In response to Japan’s nationalization 
of the Senkaku Islands, the PRC declared an ECS ADIZ and began flying sorties around 
the island on a regular basis. Also, patrols of Chinese Coast Guard ships conducted more 
routinized patrols in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and, sometimes, the territorial 
waters surrounding the disputed islands. Russia’s actions appeared due to its intentions to 
reach an agreement with Japan.122 The backlash over the Senkaku Islands became the 
canary in the coal mine highlighting the latest trend in Chinese aggressiveness that 
characterizes numerous island disputes throughout the ECS and SCS. Specifically, the 
Philippines intentionally grounded the BHP Sierra Madre Ayungin Reef, or Second 
Thomas Shoal, as an outpost in 1999 to protect against Chinese encroachment, and the 
PRC has attempted on multiple tries to starve out the sailors by preventing resupply.123 
The Vietnamese have actively disputed China’s placement of Oil Rig HD-981 within the 
Vietnamese Economic Exclusion Zone in May 2014. These are just two more instances in 
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which the Chinese have attempted to strong-arm a smaller neighbor and dismiss 
UNCLOS disputes resolution mechanisms.124  
Many in South Korea believe that Lee Myung-bak was motivated by domestic 
politics to visit Dokdo, while others point to his inability to work with DPJ Prime 
Minister Noda to resolve an ongoing issue with comfort women reparations.125 Whatever 
the reasons, Japan faced numerous setbacks to its claims to disputed islands during the 
DPJ presidency.  
Domestically, the Senkaku Fishing vessel incident and the nationalization of the 
Senkaku Islands undermined the confidence of the Japanese people as to whether the DPJ 
could effectively manage foreign policy and security issues.126 It was a political 
dream-come-true for the LDP, which wished to undermine the DPJ’s rule. Ishihara 
Shintaro, the former Governor of Tokyo, attempted to purchase the Senkaku Islands from 
its owner, a move that would have been extremely provocative.127  
The DPJ ultimately failed to handle territorial issues because it failed to control 
communications. Although America urged Japan to talk with China prior to nationalizing 
the Senkaku Islands, Noda raised money and nationalized the islands, but he failed to 
grasp the likely magnitude of backlash from Beijing or the necessity of ensuring the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) had a plan to defend the islands. The handling of the fishing 
captain incident shows the further difficulty in the DPJ’s use of strategic 
communications. The DPJ appeared to conceal important facts regarding the Chinese 
captain’s apparently intentional collision with the JCG vessel, which was only exposed 
after a JCG officer posted the video on YouTube.128 The events have led to a particularly 
durable escalation within the region when combined with China’s actions of sending 
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patrols into the contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands and unilaterally declaring an 
ADIZ over the ECSs in 2013. With Korea, the DPJ did a little better. As a result of 
President Lee’s visit to Dokdo, Japan temporarily recalled its ambassador to South 
Korea.129 This response is in keeping with the precedent that Kan Naoto set when 
President Medvedev visited the Southern Kuriles.  
DPJ policies are not solely to blame for the escalation in the Senkaku Islands. The 
dispute over the islands is as old as the Potsdam Declaration. China and Japan supposedly 
reached secret agreements for bilateral dispute settlements, but intensification started 
before the initial 2010 fishing boat captain incident.130 Chinese patrols were a regular 
occurrence prior to the fisherman incident.131 China’s increased military modernization 
may have made the Senkaku Island event a foregone conclusion no matter who was in 
power. Yet it is also important to attribute a great deal of responsibility to the LDP for its 
successful efforts at undermining the DPJ’s policies.  
3. U.S. Alliance 
Japan’s reliance on the United States has been attacked from both sides of the 
political spectrum within Japan. The DPJ’s notion of increased attention to the East could 
allow it to curb Japan’s overreliance on the U.S. military for its defense. The Hatoyama 
administration drove a wedge between Japan and the United States in a number of areas 
as soon as he came into office; however, the DPJ came reluctantly to the realization that 
its reliance on the United States was more complicated than originally understood. 
Unfortunately, some implications of Hatoyama’s initial policy decisions still echo today, 
even while relations with the United States have rebounded to new heights. Hatoyama 
tried to cancel the MCAS Futenma move to Henoko, ended Japan’s maritime refueling 
mission in the Indian Ocean, and made statements that appeared to distance Japan from 
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the United States. American officials were also difficult to deal with during this period. 
Domestic politics provided negative inertia to mending any ill-advised policies. No 
matter the policy, the implementation of these policies was done in a haphazard and ad 
hoc manner that resulted in confusion and mistrust between the two long-standing allies. 
The DPJ started its attempts to realign Japan prior to Hatoyama’s becoming the 
prime minister. “Hatoyama and his colleague, the DPJ heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa, both 
argued that Japan should seek an equidistant relationship, like an equilateral triangle 
involving Japan, China, and the United States.”132 One of the first items on the DPJ’s 
chopping block was support to Operation Enduring Freedom maritime refueling, since it 
has been tied to support for the unpopular Iraq War.133 Confusion over the DPJ’s policies 
gave many in America the wrong message. Daniel Sneider notes:  
U.S. observers … have frequently characterized the DPJ’s policies as 
aligning Japan with a powerful China at the expense of the alliance with a 
fading superpower. … The DPJ seeks to manage China’s rise through a 
combination of engagement and the assertion of Japan’s own leadership 
role in Asia.134 
Hatoyama’s plans for implementing an East Asian Community might have 
sounded like it involved the regional leadership role that America would want Tokyo to 
play, but America became worried over the DPJ’s messaging. It appeared that some 
attempted to exclude the United States from East Asia and from future Japanese efforts. 
Takahata notes: 
Speaking with Hatoyama at the Prime Minister’s Residence on October 6, 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong frankly expressed his concern 
… stressing that regionalism must be open to other countries, especially 
the United States, and Hatoyama is said to have agreed. Yet on October 7, 
speaking before the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo, 
Foreign Minister Okada excluded the US from his vision, proposing as 
members Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia and New 
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Zealand, and noted that “Japan has its national interests, and the US has its 
own.”135  
A few offhand statements, coupled with significant changes to the operation of 
the alliance, sent a message to Washington that the DPJ was not intending to send. The 
United States responded to Tokyo’s behavior by cancelling engagements, and Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates engaged his counterpart to resolve the issues.136 As China 
became less tolerant of the DPJ and North Korea became more belligerent, the DPJ 
attempted to mend its ties with the West and forsake its Yuai, or fellowship, plan in what 
Hughes calls “reluctant realism.”137 The reversal of the Government of Japan (GOJ) in its 
agreement to move MCAS Futenma had significant, but transitory implications for the 
U.S.-Japanese alliance. Ellis Krauss noted Prime Minister Hatoyama attempted to back 
out of the U.S. agreement to move MCAS Futenma to a spot within Okinawa, an 
agreement that took over a decade to negotiate:138  
The new DPJ Administration embarked on a series of policies that both 
frightened and irritated the new Obama Administration. It ended Japan’s 
refueling of U.S. and other nations’ ships in the Indian Ocean as part of 
the war in Afghanistan and pushed for an ‘East Asian Community’ to 
strengthen economic and political relations between Japan and its 
neighbors. Although these were long standing DPJ positions, and should 
not have been a surprise, combined with the new moves on Futenma they 
shocked Washington.139  
Domestically, Hatoyama had no one to help him with the Futenma debacle, as he 
essentially attempted to breach an agreement that took a decade to align with all the 
domestic political actors. The Okinawan people were one group who became energized 
in resolving this issue. Since it appeared that the DPJ was going to reopen the case, the 
political struggle that played out for 10 years had now been reopened by mistake. Even 
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today, the Henoko relocation plan continues to thwart Tokyo’s relations with the 
Okinawan governor.  
The discord between the Japanese and U.S. administrations regarding Prime 
Minister Hatoyama’s attempt to change its previous agreement to move Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma elsewhere within Okinawa resulted in a rift in the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
and weakened his credibility within Japan. Fortunately, the 2010 Japanese issue with the 
Senkaku Islands portended what types of Chinese foreign policies were to come and the 
Japanese government strengthened its alliance with the United States initially to balance 
against the Chinese attempts to claim the Senkaku Islands. The DPJ policy’s 
implementation suffered from a failure to signal the proper intentions and from a lack of 
information, which MOD involvement could have prevented, but fallout has been 
contained and the U.S.-Japanese alliance may have grown stronger since. The 
unnecessarily reopening of old wounds cooled relations between Japan and the United 
States; however, it did not cause a long-term degradation to relations. The United States 
and Japan operated bilaterally during Operation Tomodachi in 2011, and through other 
various exercises and real world contingencies spurred by North Korean missile tests. 
The DPJ simply failed to communicate its intentions in a coherent manner. Takahata 
demonstrates the confusion with Hatoyama’s policy stance on Futenma: 
DPJ leaders have been besieged with appeals from the United States, 
Britain, and Pakistan to continue the refueling mission even after the 
current law expires in January 2010, and their response has revealed a 
striking lack of consistency. In the month since the Hatoyama cabinet’s 
inauguration, top government officials have made the following 
statements: ”We are not considering a simple extension” (Prime Minister 
Hatoyama). “We are not categorically saying No” (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Katsuya Okada).  “We will withdraw without any fuss, just 
following the law” (Defense Minister Kitazawa). “We should revise the 
legal framework and continue refueling operations if possible” 
(Parliamentary Vice Defense Minister Akihisa Nagashima). “This cabinet 
should go with the decision not to extend” (Mizuho Fukushima, minister 
of state for consumer affairs and SDP president).140  
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Confusion and misspeaking could represent a fundamental disagreement borne 
out among the diverse party composition of its ruling coalition, or it could be that the DPJ 
did not know the answer. Either way, domestic pressures and pressure from America all 
resulted in the DPJ’s resentful choice to carry on the status quo in all but a few cases.  
4. Security Policy and JSDF Modernization 
During its time in power, the DPJ embraced a “vast majority of LDP-advocated 
and LDP-adopted security policies and approaches,” which Oros describes as a “historic 
moment…where the ruling coalition and opposition coalition expressed substantial 
agreement about the general contours of Japan’s security policies.”141 Interestingly, the 
DPJ released the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, which were considered a 
“dramatic break from the past” with its introduction of new concepts like “‘dynamic 
defense’, increased capabilities for the JSDF, the ‘southwest shift’ of the JSDF to respond 
to the increased China threat, relaxation of arms export restrictions…, and the strategic 
use of overseas development assistance (ODA).”142  
Foreign challenges to Japan’s national security were prevalent during the DPJ’s 
time in office. China’s continued incursions into Japanese airspace and submarine 
sightings in Japan’s territorial waters and Beijing’s enacting of strategic metal trade 
restrictions provide some examples of a militarized threat on Japan’s periphery. While 
South Korea still does not rival Japan in size or economic might, its hostile behavior 
pertaining to the Dokdo Islands provided a solid concern for Japanese security specialists 
to be concerned. Coupling these threats with the increasingly possible North Korea 
nuclear ballistic missile threat, and Japan has an appropriate reason to fear isolation from 
its neighbors. These threats provide reasons for Japan to pursue loosening the constraints 
to its “SDF.”  
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The DPJ’s attempt to mend ties with its East Asian neighbors actually further 
harmed relations and may have had an enduring effect by enabling Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo to proceed slightly faster with plans for collective self-defense. Abe’s 
reinterpretation of the Constitution for Collective Self-Defense could enable Japan to 
play a leadership role in any alliance or at least be a more equal partner. Since the DPJ 
left power, Abe has introduced numerous bills relating to the military and future 
contingencies that could reduce restrictions on the SDF, allow for more uniformed 
control, and allow for the use of force during United Nations (UN) mandated ship 
inspection boardings if compliance is not obtained.143 To use Richard Samuels’ 
metaphor, “salami slicing” of Japan’s post-war anti-military Yoshida Doctrine is 
happening in earnest now.144 Thus, the potential long-term effects could be that the DPJ 
helps undermine its own opposition for LDP security legislation. As Oros explains, “The 
virtual collapse of organized party opposition on the left—exemplified by the rise and fall 
of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from political power—further facilitates a shift to 
more activist security policies.”145  
C. CONCLUSION 
Multiple forces act on regional security in Japan’s part of the world. The DPJ’s 
overall effort to change policy depended on its ability to obtain international support for 
its plans while also retaining enough political legitimacy domestically to implement the 
changes that require appropriate communications, with which the DPJ struggled greatly. 
Issues arose, such as during Hatoyama’s administration, when leaders could not agree on 
what the East Asia Community would be. In general, Japan’s tough time desecuritizing 
China to create the equilateral triangle of diplomacy between Japan, China, and America 
reflects American, Japanese and Chinese domestic and international politics. It might be 
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somewhat naïve to think that the disputes could be resolved with a little attention and 
promises not to frequent the Yasukuni Shrine. One reason appears to relate to new 
democracies across the board. Japan is not a new democracy, but in the sense of the 
initial change to DPJ governance, it is experiencing democratic alternation of power for 
the first time. When a country attempts to democratize its security policies, the new 
leadership attempts to break old power relationships seen as providing a source of power 
for the old regime. Since the United States did provide power and legitimacy to the LDP 
during its crackdown over the Japan Communist Party and the JSP, America was 




From 1998 to 2008, South Korea experienced its first, and, so far, only period of 
opposition rule. The Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), under Kim Dae-jung (KDJ), 
and the Uri Party (URI), under Roh Moo-hyun (RMH), was voted into office to bring 
change for voters who felt disenchanted by a slowing economy and corruption under Kim 
Young-sam’s (KYS’s) Grand National Party (GNP). This chapter evaluates what effect 
KDJ and RMH had on overall regional stability, if any. 
To maintain a clear break between the two shifting coalitions, the GNP and the 
Saenuri party will be referred to as the conservative coalition, or CC. The MDP and URI 
will be referred to as the liberal coalition (LC). While the parties may not necessarily 
form coalitions in the formal sense, they broadly follow the same set of policy leanings 
and are represented by similar interests within society. Also, since social cleavages in 
Korea are unique, they should not be construed as representing views politically 
comparable to those of America or other regional democracies.146  
The first section introduces the external sources of instability from Korea’s 
perspective. These sources include balance of power trends, alliance maintenance issues, 
and trending issues with nationalism and identity that have presented challenges to 
Korea’s maintenance of regional stability. This section finishes by establishing a grading 
criterion for stability during the periods to before, during, and after each LC president’s 
administration. 
The second section analyzes sources of friction to determine whether instability is 
driven by external pressures, internal political pressures others than those associated with 
the LC, or from the policies that KDJ or RMH implemented, or failed to implement. It 
does so by looking at how much difference the policies of KDJ or RMH made on aspects 
of regional interaction that appeared the most volatile in section one of this chapter. 
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This chapter finds that both KDJ and RMH played a significant role in shaping 
domestic politics, but that their effect on regional stability seems to fleeting at best. 
A. EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Externally, Korea has often referred to itself as a shrimp among whales due to its 
position between Japan, Russia, and China.147 Its strategic picture includes sporadic acts 
of aggression and nuclear threats by North Korea, maritime disputes with an 
economically and militarily superior Japan, and active hedging between the two regional 
great powers, China and the United States. Korea has historically benefited from Western 
economic systems; however, the Asian Financial Crisis and middle income trap have 
tested Korea’s financial system, as well as its fledgling democracy.148 Nationalist and 
historical baggage left over from Japan’s annexation of Korea preceding WWI and the 
brutal occupation that followed continues to strain relations between Korea and Japan in 
ways that place Korea at odds with America. With the broad contours of the geostrategic 
background explained, the following section provides more detail.  
1. Balance of Power  
Considerations of relative military might between countries in the region hold 
considerable importance, as many countries simultaneously trade with each other and 
maintain opposition to the other country’s position based on territorial disputes, historical 
disagreements, or active hostilities. South Korea shares a land border with North Korea, 
but also shares sea borders with China, Japan, and Russia. In terms of military might, 
population and economic strength, South Korea has long been seen as the lightweight in 
the region. 
The ROK is still considered at war with North Korea; a fact that Kim Jong-Il, and 
now his son Kim Jong-Un, continue to remind its adversaries through rhetoric and 
provocation. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) is the most militarized border in the world, 
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and regular flare-ups have occurred since the 1953 ceasefire.149 North Korea has 
historically possessed a larger and more capable military, but the South’s six decades of 
explosive growth have changed the balance of power on the peninsula. Seoul’s 
technological advancement accompanying its economic high growth rate left Pyongyang 
behind in measures of GDP, amount spent on the military, and quality of advanced 
military equipment. The military expenditures (MILEX) from 1997 through 2009 for the 
major countries that factor into Korea’s defense calculations are shown in Table 2. (The 
United States was intentionally excluded, because including it would obscure spending 
differences by other regional actors. That said, America’s security commitments to Korea 
still matter, and its military spending still eclipses all others in the region.) 
South Korea’s defense spending is believed to be five times that of North Korea. 
To compensate, the DPRK has pursued asymmetric capabilities—such as nuclear, cyber, 
and special forces—to obtain advantages over its technologically superior neighbor.150 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program appears sufficient to deliver a nuclear device to 
South Korea, and potentially Japan, and this provides a minimum deterrence against 
outside attempts to topple the Kim regime. 
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Table 2.   South Korean Military Spending151 
 
 
North Korea has successfully deterred South Korean action with a mixture of 
asymmetric capabilities and attacks that can be either denied or lead to relatively little 
retaliation. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities constrain Seoul’s level of retaliation. Since 
South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, Pyongyang uses its asymmetric 
advantage to conduct skirmishes and small-scale attacks without risking a full-scale 
invasion. Micro-aggressions, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 and 
North Korea’s attacks on relatively isolated areas, seem designed to limit escalation while 
appearing tough to its domestic political audience. Finally, conventional munitions placed 
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near the DMZ may provide sufficient deterrence, as they threaten to “turn Washington 
and Seoul into a sea of flames.”152 
Pyongyang has also acted in clandestine ways to prevent escalation through 
deniability, akin to Pakistan’s use of non-state proxies in the Jammu and Kashmir region 
against India.153 North Korea denies sinking the ROK’s Cheonan in 2010, although 
international investigations have since attributed the deadly attack to one of the DPRK’s 
midget submarines.154 In the past, North Korean operatives have secretly kidnapped 
Japanese citizens from the shores of Western Japan. South Korea’s military planners 
must take these aspects of defense planning into account when thinking about the balance 
of power vis-à-vis the North.  
South Korea’s proximity and devastating history at the hands of Japan, coupled 
with the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute, also drives ROK defense spending. (ROK 
forces have occupied these islets with a small armed contingent since 1954).155 As the 
amount of militarized disputes in Table 3 show, for Seoul’s provocative behavior with 
regards to other democratic states (16 of the 17 democratic militarized interstate disputes 
[MIDs] were with Japan) and this figure/rate actually increased in the LC administration. 
Although KDJ’s and RMH’s administrations talked of improving ties,156 their actions tell 
a different story.  
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Table 3.   South Korean Militarized Interstate Disputes157 
 
Years Total MID MID/year Dem MID Dem MID/Year
48-98 103 2.06 13 .26 
98-08 15 1.5 4 0.4 
 
Although the numbers for North Korea are unreliable, it may be possible to glean 
a reversal in defense spending for the North, corresponding with the 2000 summit 
between Kim Jong-Il and KDJ. The first meeting of its kind, it brought a feeling of 
détente to the relations between the North and South.158 This was potentially again the 
case during the Kim-Roh relations that were at their height during a second summit in 
2007. The expenditure increase correlates with the hardline policies that President Lee 
Myung-bak instituted upon taking office. In the South, defense spending slowed and even 
decreased for a time under KDJ. RMH, however, did not decrease spending. South 
Korean military spending as a percentage of national budget remained around 12% after 
Roh took office in 2003.159 It does not appear that the KDJ or RMH administrations 
drastically altered the regional balance of power with their spending. Seoul’s defense 
spending kept pace with its perceived adversaries (so long as Seoul does not view Beijing 
as a potential adversary, which it does not).160 
Seoul’s reaction to China’s rise has been to move closer toward Beijing, and the 
progress of increasing Sino-Korean relations has been constant throughout political party 
changes. David Kang characterizes Seoul’s approach to China as “between balancing and 
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bandwagoning.”161 Perhaps a more appropriate word would be “accommodating” 
China’s rise, which puts South Korea’s position frequently at odds with its ally, the 
United States. From a strategic standpoint, Korea perceives that America’s influence in 
East Asia is diminishing. Korea cannot compete with China’s growth and military 
spending alone. Population wise, the PRC is more than 25 times the size of Korea and its 
GDP is 10 times that of Korea’s and growing over three times as fast.162 Korean policies 
moving closer to China, or hedging, would make sense from a realist perspective, as it 
would appear Korea is increasing economic and political ties with China, while still 
attempting to maintain relations with America.163 
While America’s presence offsets the threats the ROK faces from the North and 
its perceived concerns about Japan, it also places Korea directly between a rising China 
and a waning America. North Korea’s aggressive acts have been numerous, but also low-
scale for the most part. South Korea’s balance of power relative to Japan has changed 
only slightly, and still occupies many military leaders in Seoul. 
2. Allies and Trade Relations 
Seoul has benefited economically and militarily from its alignment with the 
United States, but over the two decades since the end of the Cold War, these ties have 
started to lose their relevance because of Seoul’s diminishing security concerns. Korea’s 
relations with the North have been marred by security flare ups, but a decrease in tensions 
occurred during the period where South Korea took a more accommodating position 
toward Pyongyang. Sino-Korean trade and cooperation has flourished as South Korea has 
accommodated Beijing’s achievement of regional great power status. Finally, Korea’s 
warming of relations with Beijing also corresponds to a degradation of bilateral relations 
with Japan, whose domestic politics have united negative sentiment against it. 
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South Korea’s view of the world is shaped by post-Cold War politics. As a market 
economy that would go on to be an advanced market-style democracy, the ROK profited 
much from residing in America’s sphere of influence. Not only did the South benefit 
from security alliance that rebuffed the DPRK, but its economy flourished by following 
the Japanese economic model of East Asian development while relying on the security 
umbrella and economic aid of the West.164 Security assurances have become less 
important as the ROK military has surpassed North Korea’s military on many indicators 
and may be able to defeat an attack by the North without outside assistance.165 Similarly, 
Korea’s blame of the West for its economic quagmire following the AFC, which KDJ 
called the “IMF Crisis,” shows that not all of Korea maintains as rosy a view of Western 
institutions.166 These trends have distanced Seoul and Washington on certain aspects, 
although only ever so slightly given how close U.S.-ROK relations remain today.167 For 
example, elites do not appear ready to change the status quo with regards to American 
basing within South Korea even as public sentiment has shifted against the continued 
American presence. Yeo notes that Korea’s protests have been effectively managed by 
the elites and military, while Moon states that anti-Americanism is a natural part of the 
democratization process and is not a wholesale revolt against America as an ally, but a 
healthy expression of democratic freedom that Koreans wish to express.168 Cooley blends 
the two arguments further by noting that many democratizing countries that host 
American bases see new politicians tap into the sentiment of anti-Americanism, 
especially if American can be seen as condoning the brutality and repression of the 
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previous regime.169 Nevertheless, Korea has become a more reluctant partner with the 
West due to some of the broad trends that have already been mentioned.  
Increasing interconnectedness and diplomatic ties with China have been Korea’s 
response to China’s continued economic and military growth. The PRC is Korea’s largest 
trade partner, surpassing the United States as the largest importer of Korean goods in 
2003, and it imports twice as much as America as of 2014.170 Furthermore, Korea has 
come to see China as a productive partner for resolving inter-Korean issues, as the PRC 
has played a crucial leadership role in the six-party talks aimed at North Korean 
denuclearization. China’s interests in maintaining a divided Korea are based on the 
American military presence on yet another of its land borders. South Korea’s distancing 
itself from America and deepening relations with Beijing reduces this concern and could 
lead to Chinese support for reunification, especially if it sees reunification as the only 
alternative to North Korea going to pieces. Finally, China and Korea share similar 
concerns about increased nationalism and historical revisionism within Japan. Most 
recently, South Korean President Park’s attendance at the 70th anniversary parade 
celebrating the defeat of Japan in WWII shows an increase in cooperation between the 
two countries on issues related to North Korea and shared views about relations with 
Japan.171 
America’s relations are strained by South Korea’s legacy of brutal authoritarian 
rule under Park Chun-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Suppression of democracy during the 
early days of the ROK was brutal under the reigns of Chun Doo-hwan, especially in 
relations to the Gwangju Massacre. Koreans direct criticism at Washington’s hypocritical 
sponsorship of dictators and the suppression of democratic activists within the ROK for 
Cold War geopolitical reasons. The cleavages are counterintuitive, as advocates for 
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democracy support manifestly anti-American sentiment, while the pro-American 
coalition often yearns for the return of authoritarian rule.172  
3. Nationalism and Identity Politics 
The rise of nationalism in East Asia and its effect on regional stability has had 
significant implications for the major powers in the region. Territorial disputes among 
Northeast Asian countries provide the impetus for future conflict, or at the least, bitter 
disputes, even though the land contested is, for the most part, not suitable for 
habitation.173 State control of historical narratives and contestation of history between 
countries fuels animus between East Asian neighbors. The ethnic nationalism that unites 
the divided Korean people has inherently stabilizing and destabilizing components that 
affect regional security. 
East Asia found itself thrust into the concept of the nation-state only after the 
WWII, and this late entry into the realm of modernity has left East Asian countries 
bitterly antagonistic regarding geographical boundaries. Japan’s historic subjugation of 
much of East Asia in the run up to and during WWII leaves many disputed islands 
between Tokyo and its neighbors. China’s rise has driven its need to assert claims on 
islands that it sees as historically Chinese. Historical interpretations of Japan’s conquest 
and brutal occupation of its neighbors clouds any progress on dispute resolution between 
parties.  
Japan’s claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands 
have been linked by Beijing and Seoul, respectively, to Japan’s brutal occupation of large 
parts of China and the Korean Peninsula starting in the 1890s. The Japanese-administered 
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Senkaku Islands are disputed by Beijing and Taipei, but Japan refuses their historic 
claims, and, therefore, refuses to submit to arbitration. History also clouds the dispute 
over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, which South Korea sees as one of the first territories 
conquered by Japan prior to WWII.174 Although the islands are not inherently life-
sustaining, and provide no more than the potential for natural resources and a sense of 
prestige, some in Korea have sought to turn them into a cultural icon akin to the Statue of 
Liberty or the Eiffel Tower.175 Japanese nationalism has a role in exacerbating Japan- 
Korea relations regarding the Dokdo Islands as well. In March 2005, Japan’s Shimane 
prefecture passed legislation proclaiming February 22nd as “Takeshima Day.”176 Many 
Japanese see the incorporation of “Takeshima” as an administrative event to be 
celebrated; however, the Korean people view it “as the celebration of Japan beginning its 
colonial conquest of the Korean peninsula.”177 Therefore, the contestation over the 
islands can become extremely volatile.  
As the PRC continues to grow economically and militarily, it has asserted its 
claim to territories that Beijing considers as inherently Chinese. China’s supposed 
irredentist claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Paracel Islands and nearly all of the 
SCS via the Spratly Islands are a sample of the claims it has made within the past 
20 years. These claims, and actions to legitimize the claims, increased the number of 
militarized interstate disputes between the JSDF, JCG and China’s PLAAF and Navy in 
Northeast Asia. In an attempt to further legitimize Beijing’s use of fighters to contest 
Japan’s presence around the Senkaku Islands, it unilaterally declared an ECS ADIZ that 
not only overlapped with Japan’s previously declared ADIZ, but also caused 
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consternation in Seoul due to its overlapping South Korea’s underwater rock, Ieodo.178 
Per UNCLOS, Seoul’s claim to Ieodo is illegitimate, as Ieodo does not appear above the 
surface of the water, but this still became a source of contention between the two 
countries.179  
China’s northeast territories project has also drawn heat from South Korea. 
China’s scientific research into the artifacts of the Goguryeo Dynasty drew attention 
when a 2004 semi-official report referred to the Goguryeo people as one of China’s 
ethnic minorities. This claim is controversial because Koreans believe the Goguryeo are 
their ancient ancestors and still derive the name Korea from the defunct kingdom.180 The 
unfortunate part is that both may be correct. The Goguryeo were traditionally one of three 
kingdoms on the Korean Peninsula and did inhabit land in what is now part of Siberia and 
Manchuria. Nonetheless, how the memory of the Goguryeo Dynasty is treated within 
Japan and Korea is still disputed, albeit much less so than those disputes that China and 
Korea share with Japan.  
State construction of history as a political tool is widely used and abused within 
East Asia. One of the clearest manifestations occurs in school textbooks, but China and 
Japan also have some unique practices that also should be pointed out. Nationalism is at 
the heart of the most contentious bilateral issues between Japan and its neighbors, China 
and South Korea. Although more countries suffered at the hands of the Japanese Imperial 
Army during WWII and before, only a handful of countries continue to keep those 
actions as a contemporary foreign policy issue. Historical memory and history textbook 
issues are a perennial source of rancor that typically results in diplomatic statements, but 
rarely rises above that.181 
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China’s patriotic education has been an intentional effort by the CCP to use a 
narrative of national humiliation to redirect domestic anger toward external countries, 
with Japan overwhelmingly receiving the most attention.182 Great monuments celebrating 
humiliating events have been erected in places all around mainland China to help 
inculcate a sense of anger and resolve among its citizens. Prominent examples include the 
statue of two hands breaking an opium pipe in celebration of the First and Second Opium 
Wars, The Nanjing Massacre memorial, and many others that the central government has 
erected since the Tiananmen Square incident to steer the narrative away from CCP 
oppression and toward a more useful narrative about external forces attacking China once 
upon a time.183 Another interesting twist is that the CCP did not acknowledge what 
happened at Nanjing until much later, possibly due to its absence in the KMT stronghold. 
Yet, once the KMT stopped staking claims to the mainland in the 1990s, China let details 
of the massacre resurface (while continuing to suppress any mention of the Tiananmen 
Square incident against its own citizens). China reserves much of its vociferous rhetoric 
for Japan, which is not innocent, itself. 
Japanese leadership since the rise of Koizumi Junichiro in 2001 has been 
markedly more nationalist in that it has discounted Japan’s atrocities during WWII and 
focuses the narrative on restoring Japan’s greatness. Koizumi recommenced paying 
homage to the war dead at Yasukuni Jinja every year. This action ties Japanese politicians 
to a revisionist history of the past, because, even though Japan visits the graves of their 
dead relatives as part of their religion, the Yasukuni Shrine contains the remains of 
14 Class-A war criminals.184 Another criticism of the shrine is that its WWII Museum, 
the Yushukan, grossly distorts historical facts of WWII seemingly painting Japan’s 
actions as those of a liberator from Western powers.185 Revisionism of textbooks within 
Japan to paint its WWII occupation of Korea in a positive light is souring relations 
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between the two countries. Specifically, the “Committee to Examine History (Rekishi 
Kento Iinkai)” was formed by LDP lawmakers to protest the government’s efforts to seek 
reconciliation on history issues.186 Both China and Korea have repeatedly lodged 
diplomatic protests against Japan’s approval of history books that tend to “whitewash” 
historical accounts of some of the most gruesome aspects of the war. Examples include 
calling the Nanjing Massacre a disputed event and excluding talk about the sexual slaves 
that Japan euphemistically called “comfort women.” While the “historical amnesia” that 
Japan has been accused of roils relations with its neighbors, only a small share of the 
political elite falls into this fundamentally revisionist camp.187 Thus, even as a few rogue 
politicians make headlines for their revisionist beliefs and actions, it diverges with the 
phenomenon in China or that of Korea. 
Korean racial nationalism based on the Korean belief that they are racially unique 
has been a driving force behind South Korea’s attempt to reunify in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.188 KDJ’s Sunshine Policy received wide popularity in the South from the 
386ers and others who increasingly felt that the ruling coalition’s hardline rhetoric had 
failed to move the DPRK closer toward reunification.189 Furthermore, the DPRK has 
used the identity of being the true keepers of the Minjok nationality as a way to dispute 
the South’s legitimacy as “true Koreans.” While this study is unsure about the rationality, 
on both sides of the DMZ, of disputing racial and ethnic supremacy on the basis of purity, 
this is a source of contention that divides ethnic Koreans and adds pressure in the south to 
unite the divided nation. This identity manifests itself in interstate politics by historically 
linking Japan and America to the genesis of splitting Korea into two in WWII and the 
Cold War, respectively. Also, America’s continued presence in Korea, especially during 
the administration of George W. Bush, resulted in resentment and hostility from those in 
the south who wished for unification. As a result, an anti-American tinge can be expected 
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to be apparent in the LC. If this belief holds true, Korea’s attempts to accept Japan’s 
apologies and deescalate tensions between the two countries may not be realized until 
after unification occurs. 
B. ANALYSIS 
When analyzing the impact that South Korea, as a middle power, has made on 
overall regional stability, it would be an exaggeration to attribute instability within East 
Asia solely to any action that a specific South Korean president has taken. Some issues 
remain, however, for which Korea plays an outsized role. The following analysis covers 
how Korea reacts to China’s rise, Korea’s role in facilitating America’s presence in the 
region, attempts at unification or managing North Korea, and the ROK’s management of 
its relations with Japan. Korea is uniquely situated, in terms of its physical proximity and 
relations, midway between the West and China, to help facilitate China’s peaceful rise. 
Both Beijing and Washington attempt to keep Seoul on good terms, but Korea makes its 
greatest contribution to regional stability when it steers a middle course between the two 
regional great powers. While aspects of China’s rise are clearly out of Korea’s control, 
Seoul has fostered good will over the past decades and has accumulated influence with 
Beijing at least concerning areas that affect Korean interests. 
Korea’s relations with America are similarly important to regional stability, 
because the ROK hosts America’s presence,  which acts as a counterbalance to Beijing, a 
check on Pyongyang’s aggressions, and a substitute for Japan’s rearmament. Even as 
America welcomes Korea’s democratization, it is concerned that this action has strained 
relations greater than at any other time in recent memory. To what extent was this 
inevitable? 
South Korea also figures prominently when discussing North Korea, a prime 
destabilizing force. South Korea has influence with its unique position vis-à-vis North 
Korea, yet the new approach to inter-Korean politics did not lead to enduring change. 
KDJ and RMH followed a new approach to inter-Korean relations that started out with 
promising results, but in the end, the Sunshine Policy seems to have little to no long-term 
effect. 
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Finally, KDJ, RMH, and LMB all promoted the idea of mending ties with Japan; 
however, relations between them soured during the 15 years of 1998–2012. Relations 
only started to thaw again under PGH thereafter. This dyadic relationship has been on the 
verge of conflict recently and is one of the tensest relationships between two coherent 
democracies.190  
In Figure 2, each period is displayed with its corresponding effect on regional 
stability, with an up arrow indicating that stability was increased during the period on 
average, down means stability was decreased, and sideways annotates no significant 
change in stability. The chart is based on, and summarizes, the author’s own analysis in 
the sections below. This chart only assesses trends in stability throughout different 
administrations. The remainder of the chapter examines whether that stability or 
instability of each area can be attributed to external constraints, internal non-policy 
constraints, or actual policy decisions, to determine whether Presidents KJD and RMH 
actually made a difference. 
 
Figure 2.  South Korea Stability Analysis 
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1. China’s Rise 
China would have grown militarily and economically regardless of South Korea’s 
actions. The aspect that the ROK had an impact on influencing was to what extent it 
invested economically in China’s growth, assuaged China’s fears of encirclement through 
constructive diplomacy, and worked with China to deal with regional issues. All in all, 
the ROK has been consistent in its constructive approach to Beijing since Roh Tae-Woo 
(RTW) was elected. Overcoming suspicion and 50 years of adversarial tensions, China 
and South Korea accomplished rapprochement in a relatively short period while Seoul 
brought Beijing into multiple regional organizations. RTW and KYS established a 
positive trend prior to KDJ’s election. Ties deepened under KDJ and RMH. However, 
RMH’s administration was seen as a net equal due to its closeness with the United States 
by the end of his presidency. LMB and PGH also successfully increased ties with Beijing, 
culminating in President Park’s signing of the China-South Korea FTA in June 2015 and 
her attendance at China’s 70th Anniversary Anti-Japan Parade in September.191 From 
careful consideration, it appears that the KDJ and RMH administrations did little to 
change the stable rise of China and increase in relations. 
Détente in Sino-South Korean relations occurred in 1992 under RTW. Major 
geostrategic forces smoothed the way for mutual recognition and normalization. First, 
China’s fear of the Soviet Union’s creating a wedge between China and North Korea was 
diminishing by 1989 as the relations thawed. Beijing no longer felt the need to hold 
Pyongyang close, and could therefore reach out to the South. Deng Xiaoping’s Reform 
and Opening provided an opportunity for Seoul to invest in China’s potentially enormous 
market. Economic ties slowly increased through the 1980s and 1990s due to each 
country’s complimentary exports.192 While warming relations with China were not 
predetermined by external events, the economic benefits for conducting business, mutual 
distrust of Japan, and mutual concern of North Korea, albeit from different vantage 
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points, provided multiple reasons and opportunities for KDJ and RMH to continue 
policies already being pursued regarding China. 
Internally, the powerful chaebol, Korea’s business conglomerates, have 
influenced government decisions significantly and have an interest in closer Sino-Korean 
relations. The impact on Korea’s economy of the aftermath of the AFC not only 
generated internal pressure for the government to increase economic ties with China, but 
also provided KDJ with pressure to hedge against the Western system that had 
miscalculated the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery package and exacerbated 
the recovery by not acting as quickly as Korea perceived it could have.193 Furthermore, 
China’s change in policies vis-à-vis Korea resulted in the potential to change nationalist 
rhetoric by, as Victor Cha terms it, the “functional amnesia” of China’s role in the 
Korean War emphasizing its strong tributary relations “during the Yi Dynasty of 1392–
1910.”194 Nevertheless, it still requires internal leadership to steer the narrative 
successfully for an increasingly nationalistic citizenry.  
KDJ continued to increase the gap between the ROK and the United States to 
reassure China that Korea was a safe bet. Chinese assistance during the AFC recovery 
also helped. Beijing’s refusal to lower its exchange rates and its 7bn Won of preferential 
loans helped Korea’s recovery. KDJ would continue to provide preferential loans to 
China and champion its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.195 
RMH’s policies were not different toward Beijing, but his use of negative nationalism 
provided one of the few examples since normalization in which Sino-Korean relations 
went through a rough patch. China’s Northeast Asia Project created a storm in South 
Korea when China claimed that the ancient Goguryeo kingdom was one of China’s ethnic 
minorities. The controversy did not reach the same intensity as Japan’s assertion of 
sovereignty over the Dokdo Islands, but the issue promoted public distrust of Beijing 
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related to its treatment of history.196 RMH’s emphasis on the Northeast Asia Project was 
more of a road bump than an obstacle to increased Sino-Korean relations, but this has as 
much to do with Beijing’s handling as it does RMH’s actions.  
To say these flare-ups only happen under the LC would be a mistake as well. 
PGH’s administration protested China’s unilateral declaration of an ADIZ in 2013. 
China’s ADIZ overlaps part of Korea’s airspace off the coast of Jeju Island and also 
completely envelops the submerged rock known as Ieodo. Again, cooler heads prevailed 
on both sides, and South Korea has gone on to sign a FTA with China in 2015 and is 
championing a “China-U.S.-ROK trilateral strategic dialogue.”197 Regardless of the 
administration, South Korea continues to make progress in institutionalizing China’s role 
in the region while increasing its economic interdependence and diplomatic reliance on 
China, especially with regard to North Korea. Korea’s policies of engagement and the 
reciprocal good will created by China provided the trust to handle even territorial and 
historical shake-ups that may have presented real problems in other relations. KDJ’s 
policies and actions were definitely positive, while RMH’s positive policies cancelled the 
negative nationalism he incited as a result of China’s Northeast Asia Project. 
2. U.S.–ROK Alliance 
The U.S. Korean alliance persists as one of the most important bilateral alliances. 
Democratization in Korea and democratic-party change has widened disagreements on 
major issues between the two countries, but the foundations of the alliance remain intact. 
Mutual respect has blossomed out of disagreements regarding how each side should deal 
with different geostrategic issues, and the bond is no better and no worse today than when 
KDJ took office in 1998.  
Externally, the end of the Cold War and a thaw in Sino-Korean relations, as well 
as Sino-Russian relations, decreased the severity of Seoul’s perceived security dilemma. 
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Coupled with its relative military strength vis-à-vis the North, South Korea’s need for 
U.S. security assurances has diminished. The ROK Army still has not taken wartime 
operational control of the Combined Forces Command within Korea, but multiple plans 
have been made and fell through regarding the shift.198 As of the present writing, these 
talks have been pushed back until at least 2020.199 President George W. Bush’s election 
provided one source of instability within the U.S.-ROK relationship.200 While KDJ found 
a willing partner in President Bill Clinton and his attempts to hold a summit prior to 
leaving office in 2000, Bush’s fiery rhetoric set back KDJ’s efforts at rapprochement with 
the North and thereby created friction between the two administrations. American 
rhetoric toward North Korea became increasingly hawkish in George W. Bush’s first 
term; Korea began to lean closer to China to find a non-military solution to the DPRK 
nuclear issues. While these differences were short-lived, other areas would further roil 
relations between the two countries. Some in America see Korea’s tilt toward China as 
troublesome, especially where Japan is concerned. Instead of a robust trilateral 
relationship between three of the region’s vibrant liberal democracies, South Korean 
military leaders have, on occasion, referred to Japan as the “greatest threat to South 
Korea” and have shown various other perspectives that diverge from America’s 
perspectives in the region. 
Domestically, Korea’s democratization has given it the potential to diverge with 
the United States on foreign policy to a greater extent than previously attempted. While 
Korea supported America’s war efforts by sending troops during Operation Enduring 
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, it has not necessarily toed the line on America’s 
attempt to trilateralize the U.S.-ROK-Japan security agreements or on Washington’s calls 
to denounce China for its actions in the SCS. While some would view South Korea as an 
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alliance partner gone awry, a better way to interpret Seoul’s action is as an exercise of its 
rights to pursue its grand strategy even when this tends to diverge slightly from 
America’s vision. As Morgan states, “the alliance needs more balance to repair it.”201 
RMH did foster negative nationalism toward America to help win his election in 2002, 
effectively souring bilateral relations during the end of KDJ’s presidency and providing 
himself with a significant amount of popular support within Korea. LMB eventually 
signed the ROK-U.S. strategic partnership and U.S. Korea FTAs and PGH has worked to 
“trilateralize” the strategic partnership to include China. Even with these differences in 
foreign policy perspective, the United States and South Korea have, in the long run, 
continued to have a vibrant alliance that mutually benefits both countries and will for 
some time to come. Any detriment that RMH or KDJ appeared to impose upon bilateral 
relations was transitory at best. Out of RMH’s destabilizing policy toward the United 
States, the ROK achieved autonomy for its foreign policy by wrestling it away from 
Washington. The relationship might not look as robust today as it did 20 years ago, but 
this thesis argues that the new alliance is built on a foundation of mutual respect and has 
now weathered democratic politics in both countries.  
3. North Korea 
KDJ democratized security policy in Korea with his Sunshine Policy of North 
Korean engagement. Many claim democratization of security policy can lead to 
conflict.202 By contrast, it would seem that inter-Korean relations improved during the 
KDJ and RMH administrations. Although short lived, the Sunshine Policy and its 
replacement under RMH decreased tensions on the peninsula while they were in office.  
Three external influences impact how Seoul and Pyongyang interact concerning 
inter-Korean relations, regardless of the intentions of South Korean policy. As one of 
North Korea’s gravest threats, the United States’ policy changes and rhetoric have an 
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outsized effect on how Pyongyang reacts. Similarly, China has been North Korea’s 
closest ally, and its policies vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula are also closely watched by 
Pyongyang, as well as by the rest of the world. Finally, no matter how badly Seoul wants 
to improve relations, North Korea’s leaders and its domestic political cohesion have 
significant implications for how much progress can be made and how close the Peninsula 
comes to conflict. The conservative coalition (CC) had made slow progress with the 
Clinton administration on an agreed framework and ban on ballistic missile proliferation, 
going so far as to almost usher in the first inter-Korean summit in 1994 prior to the death 
of Kim Il-Sung, and it nearly concluded a U.S. Korean summit between Kim Jong-Il and 
President Bill Clinton in 2000, but disputed election results required a cancellation. 
Similarly, the death of Kim Jong-Il may be said to have created similar patterns of 
instability that resulted in the sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan and the shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island. Seoul’s interests in the peaceful resolution of inter-Korean relations 
have continued to converge with those of Beijing since the early 1990s and continue to 
share a great degree of similarity even today.203 Both countries have an interest in 
constraining North Korea from taking destabilizing actions, each agrees on the 
denuclearization of the peninsula, and, unlike America, both agree that keeping North 
Korea from going to pieces is more important than immediate and unconditional 
denuclearization.204 The more China attempts to cajole Pyongyang into cooperation 
through the six-party talks or other frameworks, the less cooperation the Kim regime 
appears to offer.205 The South has victoriously turned Pyongyang’s staunchest ally at 
least neutral, and in some cases, more aligned with Seoul today. 
The United States acted has security guarantor to the South during the past 60-
plus years, but it also has presented an existential threat to the regime in Pyongyang. 
More so than South Korea, the policy positions of Washington drive the Kim regime to 
act in ways viewed as irrational to outside observers. The harsh reaction of the DPRK to 
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annual military exercises is a prominent example. The reversal of policy positions and 
rhetoric from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush could not have been starker when it came 
to North Korea. KDJ and Clinton were simultaneously implementing the Sunshine Policy 
and the agreed framework. Warming of relations was at a high point in June 2000 when 
KDJ became the first President of South Korea to meet Kim Jong-Il in the North. Bush’s 
“axis of evil” comments increased the suspicions of North Korea, but also infuriated the 
South. RMH thought he was making real progress with the North in Bush’s first term, but 
the increased hostility drove a wedge between the North and South dialogue that only 
America could remove, which, in turn, decreased the strength of working relations 
between the United States and South Korea. LMB mended U.S.-ROK bilateral relations, 
but he almost completely shut the door to North Korea as a consequence. Not only did 
the North walk back from areas of cooperation, but its stunning reversal in policies may 
have prompted significant shows of DPRK military might, including the sinking of the 
Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. PGH has taken a middle road between 
“dichotomous appeasement and hardline pressure.”206 It is important to note that 
increased tension along the Korean border has characterized most of her presidency thus 
far; however, less actual carnage has been involved than under LMB. In short, many 
inter-Korean relations breakthroughs that occurred under KDJ and RMH have evaporated 
under today’s CC presidents. KDJ and RMH made a difference, both in positive and 
negative ways; however, many of those changes were temporary. Instability within U.S.-
ROK relations seems to have led to a new equilibrium that may not be as amenable to 
American interests, but is more stable and based upon democratic fundamentals that 
appear less likely to be altered.  
The domestic politics of divided government also significantly constrained the 
Kim and Roh administrations. KDJ’s Vice President and Minister of Unification were 
blocked in the South Korean legislature. Holding up Kim Jong-Pil and economic reforms 
did not directly affect KDJ’s Sunshine Policy, but it was part of the reason that the MDP 
lost seats in the 2000 general election and yielded a split government for an entire 
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administration. Either way, this drawback would only characterize the first election of the 
LC, unless the party failed to institutionalize the experience. Finally, KDJ faced a split 
government. RMH’s government was split for the first and last years. While South 
Korean presidents have more power compared to America’s or Japan’s leaders, they still 
require (at least) a majority to vote in favor of reforms in the National Assembly to pass 
legislation.207 The ruling coalition attempted to obstruct implementation of the Sunshine 
Policy in 2000 by arranging a vote of no confidence on the Unification minister.208  
Also, personal politics and regionalism fail to result in lasting social cleavages. If 
solid party power were consolidated, and if the public endorsed KDJ’s policies on North 
Korea, RMH would not have to sidestep the issue of policy differences. When RMH was 
asked whether he would change the Sunshine Policy, he stated: 
I don’t think there is a particular reason for my policy to be different from 
the former President’s policy. I will try to improve the methodology by 
consulting with the opposition party and winning more approval of the 
people and increasing transparency of the process.209 
The height of legislative obstruction to the opposition coalition’s attempt to 
govern came during the 2004 impeachment trial of RMH. Although RMH was eventually 
cleared by the Supreme Court, this action would foreshadow his difficulties with 
domestic political friction. As a result of failing to manage a coalition, KDJ failed to 
accomplish most of his ambitious agenda and RMH was impeached. Domestic politics 
played a significant role in constraining Korean presidents, but it is not the whole story. 
Policy-wise, KDJ was instrumental in defining a social cleavage for inter-Korean 
relations, although it did not persist with any force. His Sunshine Policy got out ahead of 
the Korean population in a manner that reinforced political trends within South Korea. 
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Furthermore, it resonated with a democratic movement that saw it as a logical corollary 
to the movement that freed the south from the subjugation of the Chun Doo-hwan 
administration. The idea of North Korea as a part of one Korea is a popular sentiment, 
especially since many families are still separated by the DMZ. An ethnic sentiment 
corresponding with Minjok nationalism, as a fundamentally distinct race of people, 
underpins the idea of eventual unification.210 KDJ was able to mobilize people toward a 
fundamental change in policy, resulting in the first inter-Korean summit with Kim Jong-Il 
in 2000; and as a result, family reunions started again in Mount Kumgang for the first 
time since 1985.211 After two historic summits, progress stopped, but not because South 
Koreans wished for it to stop; domestic politics changed. LMB was elected to replace 
RMH as president and his North Korea policies were again marked by hardline political 
calculations.212 It was during his term that the ROK’s Cheonan was sunk and 
Yeonpyeong Island was shelled.213 The transition affected not only inter-Korean 
relations, but also South Koreans’ views of North Korea. By demonizing the North, 
President Lee could paint both KDJ and RMH as dangerous regarding national security 
and allow fear of the attacks to take hold and erase any progress that had been made. The 
politics of fear is not unique to South Korea’s democracy. America fears an ambiguous 
terrorist threat. China fears strategic encirclement and “splittism,” and Taiwan fears that 
the People’s Liberation Army will cross the Taiwan Straits in force. However, in Korea, 
fearmongering with the North easily becomes a self-licking ice cream cone as the CC can 
show LC weakness by antagonizing the North and appear to provide the tough policies 
needed to protect the South while bolstering its poll numbers. Overall, progress was made 
between North Korea and South Korea, but that progress is susceptible to fear and 
domestic policies, as well as to extra-regional, sabre rattling that can nullify any real 
                                                 
210 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 185. 
211 Sang-hun Choe, “Amid Hugs and Tears, Korean Families Divided by War Reunite,” The New York 
Times, February 21, 2014, http://web.archive.org/web/20140221091325/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/ 
21/world/asia/north-and-south-koreans-meet-in-emotional-family-reunions.html. 
212 Chung-in Moon, “South Korea in 2008: From Crisis to Crisis,” Asian Survey 49, no. 1 (2009): 
120–28, doi:AS.2009.49.1.120. 
213 “North Korea Profile—Timeline,” January 14, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-
15278612. 
 72
success. KDJ’s Sunshine Policy achieved some degree of success at mending inter-
Korean relations. He clearly championed the cause as a candidate and democratized inter-
Korean relations and other security issues, and his foreign policy achieved marked 
success in the initial years of the agreement. Some have criticized the policy as 
wrongheaded, or even a setback the coercive levers that might bring Kim Jong-Il to the 
bargaining table.214 Kim Il-Sung, his son, and grandson seem to respond negatively to 
threats and positively toward engagement policies. KDJ’s policies addressed that, but did 
not build the international coalition behind his policies necessary to usher in new 
relations with the North. 
Roh also had an impact on furthering engagement policy toward North Korea. For 
domestic political reasons, he could not claim to be doubling down on the Sunshine 
Policy; but for all intents and purposes, this seemed to be his plan. In this manner, both 
Roh and Kim had a positive, stabilizing effect on inter-Korean relations. However, 
whatever gains were made were constrained by U.S. policy shifts, domestic political 
machinations, and political stability within North Korea. As the North has continued its 
usual routine of aggression and cooperation, inter-Korean relations under PGH are 
essentially back to what they were prior to LC attempts to change the status quo. 
4. Japan 
Although South Korea seems fixated on Japan’s potential to take the islands by 
force, it is unclear that Japan has shown the capability or intent to take back the islands 
by force. To the contrary, Japan has tried to resolve the dispute diplomatically by 
attempting to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice on three separate 
occasions.215 
The LC’s policy ambitions for Japan also ran into unexpected roadblocks. First, 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s administration drew some amount of popular support 
from overtly nationalistic shows of support at the Yasukuni Shrine and the first few 
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annual disputes over history textbooks. KDJ worked with Koizumi while remaining 
critical of specific events. Although the United States continued to push for a trilateral 
strategic partnership, these plans did not go far. Depending on how the geostrategic 
relationship is viewed, Japan could be one of Korea’s greatest allies or one of Korea’s 
largest threats. With China’s military modernization and North Korea’s continued 
intransigence, South Korea sees its greatest chances to hedge between China and 
America. At first, this does not seem to impact Japan and Korea’s relations; but as 
Japan’s economy slows, and its conservative politicians increasingly turn to the past to 
invoke a sense of nationalism, its neighbors have united in anger and outrage that has 
brought China and South Korea much closer on their Japan policy than before. 
Korea’s nationalism and identity politics have been equated to the tail that wags 
the dog.216 Appealing to nationalism has been a tried and true method of engendering 
popular support among democracies, albeit with foreign policy implications. By using 
fiery rhetoric in Korea with regards to Japan’s domestic actions, RMH incited negative 
nationalism as a way to push back against Japan while attempting to raise his popularity. 
As the two sides traded diplomatic messages regarding the Dokdo Islands, RMH made 
statements that appeared to cause a regression in diplomacy, for example, that “true 
reconciliation with Korea can come only after apology and reparation, which is 
predicated on the finding of truth.”217 Moon and Li paint the nationalistic reactions of 
RMH as rational given the nationalistic trends that occurred in Japan under Koizumi’s 
government.218 However, unlike Roh’s reactions, the only action that Koizumi actually 
conducted was visiting the Yasukuni shrine, and while this may be inappropriate for good 
international relationship management purposes, it is hard to see how a purely ceremonial 
action can be viewed as worthy of “diplomatic war of nationalism.”219 Midford takes 
another view of the fateful interaction, describing it not only as a diplomatic war, but also 
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as a near miss from actual conflict.220 A little over a year after the 2005 dispute over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands and historical textbooks, South Korea and Japan were involved 
in a militarized interstate dispute near the disputed islands in which Prime Minister 
Koizumi may have averted a conflict by recalling his maritime survey ships at the last 
moment.221 This action appears to have been destabilizing, but the nature of the 
instability seems to be more persistent than seen with the gains of the Sunshine Policy. 
LMB became the first Korean President to visit the Dokdo Islands, poking a thumb in 
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s eye before leaving office. Interestingly, Prime Minister 
Noda was part of the progressive DPJ that was anti-Yasukuni and pro-engagement with 
Korea, and other East Asian neighbors. LMB was being driven more by domestic 
political rhetoric, a rhetoric that RMH had fervently whipped up by castigating and 
publicly denouncing Japan.222 Another example is the domestic political backlash LMB 
received when Korea and Japan signed a military information-sharing agreement in 
2012.223 
KDJ worked successfully with Prime Minister Koizumi to cohost the World Cup 
and attempted to deal head on with the history textbook issues and visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine.224 While KDJ tried to work through differences, his progress was marred by an 
increasingly vociferous RMH, who used anti-Japanese and anti-American rhetoric to win 
election. Under RMH, political criticism took on a life of its own as Korean nationalism 
started to fuel the need for politicians to act in an increasingly brash manner toward 
Tokyo. During the dispute over undersea surveying in 2006, RMH brought the two 
countries to the edge of open conflict near the disputed Dokdo Islands.225 Whether or not 
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this was his intention, domestic rhetoric continued to fuel aggressiveness in Korean 
foreign policy even after he left office. LMB came into office wanting to repair the 
relationship with Japan, but he ended his term by becoming the first president to visit the 
disputed Dokdo Islands. Economic interdependence suffered between the two countries, 
as RMH allowed a currency swap agreement to expire, and, in 2004, talks halted on the 
Korea-Japan FTA.  
It seems that policies can matter in Korea, but the real influence that any 
politician has over relations between Japan and South Korea has to do with the rhetoric 
they use and the confidence building that goes into ensuring that each domestic populace 
deescalates from the destructive negative nationalism feedback loops. PGH has attempted 
to rein in domestic hatred of Japan by moving slowly to build relations back to a 
workable level. Relations are still not as warm as they were under KDJ and Koizumi, but 
part of that fact has to do with Japan’s Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo. It is a mark of 
progress that Abe not only upheld the Kono statement and set a conciliatory tone during 
his speech upon the 70th anniversary of the conclusion of WWII, but also that his 
administration appears to be making history by attempting to settle the “comfort women” 
controversy. 
Overall, then, South Korean presidents do matter in their relations with Japan, but 
are significantly constrained by domestic political concerns and Japanese political 
actions. Most notably, KDJ and PGH have successfully improved relations between the 
South and Japan, whereas RMH and LMB fueled the flames of nationalism for domestic 
political gains. The greatest and most enduring effect that a president has on bilateral 
relations is how that president goes about dealing with political controversies. While 
PGH used a cold shoulder to isolate Japan, RMH actively berated Japan for its “tendency 
to invade.”226 
                                                 
226 Midford, “Historic Memory vs. Democratic Reassurance,” 84. 
 76
C. CONCLUSION 
Political consolidation is a natural part of the democratization process. KDJ took 
an even-keeled approach to improving relations with China, revolutionizing inter-Korean 
relations, and working cautiously with Japan through a partnership on the 2002 World 
Cup while talking through thorny history issues. While relations with America were 
strained under KDJ, this was due less to Korea’s drastic policies than to political changes 
that occurred in the transition from President Clinton to President Bush. It is impossible 
to ascertain whether similar issues would occur under a CC. It seems that the real lesson 
is that when two democratic countries deal with security issues, two democratic changes 
of power can yield distance between the alignments of the countries’ interests. While 
KDJ’s policies seemed to complement those of President Clinton, this was not 
immediately the case with President Bush.  
To build upon disapproval over the apparent gap between America’s and South 
Korea’s approach to North Korea, RMH used North Korea policy and base issues to build 
an anti-American platform to run for the presidency. Once elected, he quickly had to 
moderate his views, but this change did not instantaneously remove the negative 
sentiment that RMH stirred in the Korean population. It was not only anti-Americanism 
that Roh was peddling; his anti-Japan rhetoric took a decade to die down and has 
poisoned the sentiment of a generation of young Koreans. Of course, he did not do this 
alone. Politicians within Japan gave him much fodder with which to work. Regarding 
China, RMH continued the progress of accommodating China’s rise while enmeshing it 
into the regional framework, but nationalism again reared its head with regards to Korean 
historical sites and artifacts that China attempted to claim as its own. No real effect 
resulted, but nevertheless, this case shows how a reactive president can make a mountain 
out of any molehill. Last, but not least, RMH’s near continuation of the Sunshine Policy 
was successful, but did not survive beyond his presidency. It took the transition of 
President Obama and LMB before the DPRK perpetrated attacks on the Cheonan and 
Yeonpyeong Islands.  
Therefore, while the KDJ and RMH administrations possessed destabilizing 
elements—that is, the president can matter—multiple constraints are also leveraged 
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against young parties, and security democratization is an event that happens only once. 
Many of the difficulties that occurred between Korea and the United States do not seem 
to be a recurring theme; however, the row with Japan could definitely play out again in 
future changes of power, as at least 50% of Korea’s population still regards Japan with 
suspicion and domestic politics may benefit politicians who play into that suspicion. In 
the long run, economic forces and person-to-person interactions may lessen anti-Japanese 
rhetoric, but at the time of this writing, it is still a significant undercurrent of Korean 
democracy. 
Democracy takes already hotly contested strategic relations within East Asia and 
adds another layer of complexity to. The peacefulness of democracy in East Asia is tested 
by the area’s many social issues, which had been bottled for centuries under a cap of 
authoritarianism.227  
The two exceptions seem to be the progress made with North Korea and the 
deterioration of relations with Japan. Inter-Korean relations ebb and flow, but no doubt 
exists that from 2000–2008, a major thaw in relations was evidenced, only to be thwarted 
by the election of hardliner LMB. Similarly, relations between Korea and Japan cannot 
be considered good prior to KDJ’s election, but an attempt to reach out failed, not 
because of Korean policies, but because of the rise in Japanese nationalism and the 
negative Korean reaction to Japan’s policies. RMH’s efforts to cultivate negative 
nationalism around issues between Japan and Korea resulted in over a decade of frosty 
relations. PGH, the current president, waited over a year for the first meeting with her 
counterpart, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Sure enough, political changes in South Korea 
come from a politician’s ability to steer the public narrative and invoke nationalism. 
Otherwise, policies and attempts to change without popular support seem severely 
constrained by a number of sources. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
In the previous chapters, this thesis focused on individual countries and 
administrations to determine whether a new government made a difference in each case. 
The answer was mixed. While Hatoyama and Roh made a difference in some ways, in 
others they did not effect change. This chapter concludes by addressing the areas in 
which new administrations made a difference, those where they met constraints, and 
those that deserve further study. 
A. WHERE DID NEW ADMINISTRATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
Administrations in Japan and Korea made a difference in their efforts to 
democratize the security policy and achieve greater foreign policy autonomy from the 
United States. By democratizing security policy, Hatoyama made it conceivable for 
Japanese citizens to question openly Japan’s continued strong alliance with the United 
States. That it did not change this alignment is a consequential but separate issue. KDJ 
moved to desecuritize the North Korean threat and to seek rapprochement with Kim 
Jong-il. In both cases, these policies contributed to the administration’s failure, but the 
process was important for both procedural democracies. Achieving greater foreign policy 
autonomy provided citizens with a sense of sovereignty that may have been questioned 
before. It also allows Seoul and Tokyo to better advance their own interests even when 
they do not neatly align with those of Washington. 
1. Democratization of Security Policy 
One of the ways in which the DPJ, the MDP, and Uri party made a difference was 
by democratizing security policy. Democratization of the security policy was evident: 
KDJ set a dramatically different course for South Korea’s relations toward North Korea. 
Not only did he provide coherent policy prescriptions that appeared to have decreased the 
tension on the Korean peninsula, but he also created one of South Korea’s first cross-
cutting political cleavages, which appeared to erode regionalism. While reason exists to 
suspect whether that cleavage endured, the portion of the population who approved of 
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engagement with North Korea and disapproved of U.S. rhetoric can be credited for 
RMH’s election in 2003.228  
The case is not so clear-cut with Japan. Clearly, the JSP and the Japan Communist 
Party were allowed to voice their opinions, within limits, even during the Cold War. 
Neither party ever held enough seats in the Diet or enough senior positions within the 
bureaucracy to influence foreign policy in a major way. Since Japan’s foreign policy 
levers are pulled by bureaucrats, the LDP’s long run of dominance provided significant 
institutional inertia by promoting personnel aligned with the LDP to top levels.229 For 
this reason, Hatoyama’s distancing himself from the bureaucracy effectively allowed his 
administration to alter Japan’s foreign policy direction. This was not proof that Japan had 
democratized its security policy. The Japanese people did not vote for the DPJ because of 
the foreign policy prescriptions Hatoyama attempted to implement, but, rather, voted for 
the DPJ because of a loss of confidence in the LDP’s ability to fix the economy.230 
During the elections that followed the Japanese people also showed their intolerance for 
the DPJ’s ineptitude in foreign affairs. In the 2010 Upper House elections, the DPJ 
suffered setbacks in the Diet; and in the 2012, Lower House elections it was swiftly 
ushered out of power.231 Abenomics may have had something to do with Japan’s 
reelection of the once maligned ex-prime minister, but Pekkanen and Reed illustrate that 
foreign policy also jumped higher on voters’ priority list from 2009 to 2012.232 Clearly, 
the Japanese decided at least in part that what the DPJ’s approach to foreign policy did 
not work, and they decided to give the LDP another chance.  
This differs from earlier non-LDP administrations. The Hosokawa administration 
came to power not through a foreign policy mandate from the people, but due to voter 
disenchantment over the LDP’s failure to improve the economy and avoid scandal. It was 
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also an exercise in political maneuvering, since Hosokawa came to power by cobbling 
together a tenuous coalition that was only united by opposition to the LDP. Since 
Hosokawa’s significant accomplishment was restructuring the political system, and since 
his coalition fell apart through political maneuvering and not voting, this does not 
represent an example of voters’ actively voting to shape foreign policy outcomes. 
Similarly, the Murayama administration did not provide an example of voters’ 
making a stand on foreign policy grounds. Murayama came to power through a political 
deal between the LDP and the JSP, not in a general election. The LDP coopted the JSP by 
promising to install Murayama as a coalition prime minister. Murayama’s administration 
did strike a new chord with Japan’s neighbors. It was not his foreign policy that doomed 
his party, but rather misfortune and politics. The Kobe earthquake and the Tokyo subway 
sarin gas attack were both domestic emergencies that the Murayama government botched. 
Also, because the JSP was a party that opposed the JSDF, photos of Murayama on a 
JMSDF ship became politically damaging for the party.233 Thus it was not so much that 
the voters wanted to change Murayama’s foreign policies as it was that the minority of 
JSP voters within Japan felt abandoned by the leader of their party, while the LDP 
became strong enough to no longer need the JSP as coalition partners. 
There is reason to be skeptical of this claim. The March 11 disaster happened a 
little over a year before the election for which the DPJ was thrown out of power, and like 
the sarin gas attack, involved a domestic emergency. The nuclear disaster and tsunami 
were significant events that weighed on people’s minds, but it was the multitude of 
missteps regarding security and foreign policy that, in total, became the impetus to throw 
the DPJ from power in 2012. One might also argue that in the minds of Japanese voters, 
the administration’s reaction to the nuclear disaster and tsunami could be put under a 
broad “crisis management” category that could also include Japan’s security policy 
concerns. 
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2. Greater Foreign Policy Autonomy 
Each change of the party in power involved an increase in the state’s control over 
its own foreign policy. Both Japan and South Korea have relied on American bases and 
troops to maintain their security since WWII. Both countries’ new governments came to 
power and opposed the United States in one form or another. While initially 
destabilizing, both were transient. Now Japan and South Korea have more leverage in 
foreign policy prescriptions and are in a stronger position to choose policies that do not 
always align with Washington’s. 
In Japan, Hatoyama attempted to change the status quo with regard to two aspects 
of U.S.-Japan relations: the Futenma relocation and Indian Ocean refueling mission. 
Hatoyama’s cessation of the Indian Ocean refueling mission came amid numerous 
requests from foreign countries to continue providing support. Although he was 
successful in decreasing the already-meager support for the international coalition in 
Afghanistan, this act alone did not affect regional stability. He failed to relocate Futenma 
outside of Okinawa, but the lingering effects of his attempt still plague domestic politics 
within Japan today.234 Hatoyama’s attempt to change Japan’s strategic outlook to a more 
Westward-focused policy startled America and led to concerns about whether Japan’s 
actions reflected a shift in regional dynamics.  
Similarly, South Korea saw major changes in its policy positions vis-à-vis the 
United States pertaining to North Korea and general public sentiment toward U.S. bases. 
KDJ’s policy toward North Korea did not greatly diverge from the Clinton 
administration’s stance, but, when compared to the George W. Bush administration’s 
views, Kim’s policies seemed to put South Korea in opposition to America’s foreign 
policy prescriptions, something not often expected before. With base relocation issues 
and blame directed toward the U.S. Army for the death of two schoolgirls, RMH’s anti-
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American sentiment became popular within South Korea around 2003. It appears that the 
base issue may have been less persistent than overall anger at the United States. In 2009, 
LMB received pushback from the Korean people over concerns about the safety of U.S. 
beef. These developments all point to the Korean people’s preference for Seoul to 
represent their wishes irrespective of Washington’s policy preferences.  
These similar cases show commonality between two U.S. allies that appear 
dissatisfied with playing follow-the-leader on foreign policy. While the preceding 
chapters identified a short-term increase in instability due to the democratization of each 
country’s security policies, both Tokyo and Seoul share many interests with Washington 
and continue to work with the United States on a wide range of issues without having to 
capitulate on areas over which they do not agree. South Korea’s refusal to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership does not mean that it intends to make the United States withdraw all 
American forces from the peninsula. It is in Seoul’s best interest to keep U.S. forces on 
the peninsula, at least in the near term, as a strategic deterrent. Similarly, Japan’s bilateral 
relations with Vietnam and the Philippines do not detract from its support for basing or 
for working bilaterally with U.S. forces, and may even be mutually beneficial for both 
countries.  
B. WHY WERE NEW ADMINISTRATIONS CONSTRAINED? 
The new administrations were constrained in accomplishing their agendas for 
multiple reasons. The main constraints were those that resulted from inexperience in 
governing and a general lack of information, as well as those that resulted from the 
divergence between the objectives set forth by politicians and the preferences of domestic 
and international actors. The best example of inexperience and lack of information is 
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s misguided attempt to change the MCAS Futenma relocation 
agreement with the United States. President KDJ’s Sunshine Policy implementation is the 
best of several examples of divergent interests. 
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1. Inexperience and Lack of Information 
New administrations lack governing experience, and, for the most part, their 
personnel have not been active in positions where policy experience could be gained 
prior to ascending to the executive branch. Since the LDP in Japan promoted its own 
interests in the bureaucracy for over 50 years, the DPJ felt that bureaucrats were 
unreliable in its administration’s plans to change foreign policy postures.  
Disregard for a major arm of the executive branch was detrimental to the DPJ in 
multiple ways. First, Hatoyama committed to revising the Futenma relocation plan after it 
had taken ten years to come to an initial agreement with a majority of stakeholders. His 
populist message resonated with the opposition groups in Okinawa in ways that continue 
to plague the central government today. However, Hatoyama had no reason to believe a 
better deal was to be had. His naiveté, coupled with an overly optimistic foreign policy 
prescription set on redefining relations with China and Korea, caused Hatoyama to take a 
leap of faith. 
Secondly, bureaucrats—and even DPJ politicians in the MOD—were signaling 
that Hatoyama’s idea was ill-advised, but he proceeded to marginalize the MOD and push 
for his version of Futenma realignment despite the difficulties it would present for the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. As a part of the executive branch, Hatoyama should have been able 
to enact new policies through official channels, but instead of building consensus and 
obtaining the full picture he chose to sideline ministry officials who disagreed with him. 
His approach to dealing with the bureaucracy allowed for much more change, but it also 
resulted in a significant portion of the regional instability that this thesis has identified. 
Similarly, Hatoyama did not understand dynamics between Japan and China well enough 
to bring rapprochement, and consequently, required the DPJ reluctantly to increase ties 
with Washington again.235  
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2. Divergence of Domestic and International Objectives and Preferences 
Both Japan and Korea ran into policy constraints in the form of international 
actors that held greatly different interests. Japan’s notion of moving Futenma outside of 
Okinawa was opposed by the United States, but the DPJ also received pushback within 
Japan from multiple directions. The U.S. Secretary of Defense started to cancel high-
level meetings and refused to negotiate any option other than moving MCAS Futenma to 
Henoko. President Obama quickly became cold with Tokyo after Hatoyama sent 
messages that sought to distance Tokyo from Washington while representing the interests 
of Okinawa more directly. Constraints in Japan were not simply a fluke.  
In Korea, KDJ attempted to change inter-Korean relations through the 
implementation of the Sunshine Policy. His efforts were obstructed in the National 
Assembly and derailed by President George W. Bush’s hardline approach toward 
Pyongyang. The conservative opposition party obstructed the implementation of the 
Sunshine Policy by refusing to confirm Kim’s unification minister. This obstruction was 
only further complicated when President George W. Bush made his speech labeling 
North Korea part of the “axis of evil.” Significant disagreements between Washington 
and Seoul became evident and that rift became fodder for domestic politics. Efforts to 
derail the Sunshine Policy were not wholly successful, but in the end, policies toward the 
North hardened under LMB and PGH. Nearly all progress made under the Sunshine 
Policy, including the Kaesong industrial complex, has been undermined by actors on all 
sides. Upon implementation of President Lee’s tougher foreign policy prescriptions, the 
North started its belligerent behavior, including the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island and 
the sinking the ROK’s Cheonan. Nuclear and missile tests have continued to escalate 
since President Park came into office. Last year’s box landmine incident along the DMZ 
resulted in a change in shells, and eventually, the shuttering of the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex.236 
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C. FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY 
During the research for this thesis, two other areas of study stood out. Taiwan 
appeared as a prominent case study, albeit with some caveats, that could be studied for its 
own sake. Also, research into democratic consolidation appears to overlap and attempts 
to explain some of the phenomena that this thesis noted in previous chapters. While 
beyond the scope of this study, both areas provide room for further enrichment into the 
dynamics of political party change and its effects on regional stability. 
1. Taiwan as a Promising Case Study 
Although Taiwan was not presented in depth within this study, the eight-year, 
two-term, DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian illustrates some of the same trends 
outlined in this paper. Chen’s popular support stemmed from the independence 
movement, which consequently made him unpopular with the PRC. During the Chen 
administration, cross-Strait relations (CSR) fell to their lowest point in decades. 
“Washington and Beijing began to ‘co-manage’ Taiwan.”237 Eventually, the PRC passed 
an Anti-Secession Law, which states that any attempt to declare independence would 
result in the PRC’s opposition by all means necessary, including force.238 CSR have 
cooled under his successor Ma Ying-jeou, but his alignment with Beijing cost his party in 
the polls.239 
Taiwan, which is isolated from many international organizations and treaty 
alliances because of its peculiar status vis-à-vis China, is considered by the PRC to be a 
domestic issue, but Taiwan still appears to have ambiguous assurances under the Taiwan 
Relations Act that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully. Shelley Rigger notes that 
“Chen undertook a series of initiatives aimed at raising Taiwan’s international status: 
promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues related to Taiwan’s 
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sovereignty, filing an application for United Nations membership for ‘Taiwan.’”240 It is 
clear that Chen’s administration attempted unilaterally to change its international profile 
in an attempt to acquire more of the trappings of other independent countries. But divided 
government proved to be a problem for Chen Shui-bian. As Shelly Rigger notes, “For 
seven years, the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan refused to appropriate funds to 
purchase most of what the United States was willing to sell.”241 It had the effect of 
further deteriorating the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Yet deteriorating relations may not be 
as clear-cut as cause and effect of Chen’s actions. Although Chen pushed for referenda 
and other measures that attempted unilaterally to change the status quo to provide Taiwan 
more international recognition, his initial tone toward China was not nearly as radical. 
The new party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, has also moderated the DPP’s stance on 
independence. Independence is still a contentious part of the party plank, but it has not 
been a part of her political message.242 Perhaps certain other pressures, such as domestic 
PRC concerns and relative balance of power change between China and America, also 
factor into interactions amongst the United States, China, and Taiwan from 2000–2008. 
Taiwan’s DPP, as it heads to its second presidency, seems to provide an important 
caveat. Although newly elected DPP President Tsai has successfully moderated her 
party’s views, the PRC views the DPP as hostile to PRC interests regardless of its stated 
position. Taiwan’s ambiguous state/sub-state position, coupled with the diverging 
interests of the PRC and Taiwan, appear to place the two on a collision course. The 
underlying shift of identity within the Taiwan populace, not any specific president or 
administration, appears to be the driving force of this instability.  
Although the Taiwanese case is similar to those of Japan and South Korea, it is 
important to study on its own. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, future studies 
could better compare or study Taiwan’s constraints on administration effectiveness for its 
own sake. 
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2. Democratic Consolidation? 
Another area that has been further studied, but that lies mainly beyond the scope 
of this paper, is whether incomplete democratic consolidation is the mechanism to blame 
for instability among Asia’s nascent democracies. Cho argues, “A combustible mix of 
national identity politics and incomplete democratic consolidation creates fertile ground 
for belligerent foreign policy behavior in East Asia, along the way jeopardizing regional 
stability.”243 However, is this the case? To make this argument, Cho defines democratic 
consolidation as “when democracy becomes ‘the only game in town,’”244 but, as Andreas 
Schedler explains, “for all its thinness and simplicity, [the concept of democratic 
consolidation] poses considerable problems of operationalization and measurement.”245 
The reason that this paper does not focus squarely on the angle of democratic 
consolidation as the key factor is that consolidation, depending on how it is defined, 
appears to be almost aspirational, something that all democracies strive to approach but 
do not achieve for any length of time. Cho elaborates that East Asian democracies fail in 
two aspects of consolidation, ineffective party systems and personality-based electoral 
politics.246 The problem with this pronouncement is that Japan has effectively used its 
single-party dominant system to accommodate major changes in Japan, and when the 
LDP appeared to falter, another political party achieved political salience. The party 
system in Japan has worked to make the elite responsive to its constituents without more 
than one viable party since the 1950s.  
Similarly, the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan has greatly 
institutionalized its party to the extent that its party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, just won the 
presidency. Its opposition, the KMT, has had a strong Leninist-style party system since it 
migrated over from the mainland in 1949. It is not clear how these party systems can be 
deemed ineffective. Perhaps, a better case could be made for the ROK, but its shifting 
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party system still offers a solid choice between the Grand National/Saenuri Party and the 
offshoot of the Millennium Democratic/Minjoo Party. If the criticism is the lack of policy 
choices offered by the candidates, perhaps it relates more to how politics resonates with 
voters in East Asia. Why do personality-based politics matter more in these countries 
than in other established democracies? 
Personality-based politics provides the other reason that East Asian states are 
considered not consolidated. Populism greatly affects the political battles in East Asia, 
but it is not clear how it is different from established democracies elsewhere in the world. 
Clearly, populist presidents like Koizumi Jun’ichiro, RMH, and Chen Shui-bian all left a 
legacy of increased nationalism, and potentially, contributed to regional instability. The 
author would argue that populism is by and large on the rise worldwide. Silvio 
Berlusconi of Italy was a populist prime minister who served the longest since WWII. 
His populist appeal does not somehow degrade Italy’s record of post-war democracy. 
Instead, populism is just a phenomenon that affects democracies that become dissatisfied 
with other choices. It could be that major party realignment is needed to fit the changing 
electorate or it could be that expectations in economic performance are not being met. In 
the latter case, very few real solutions may exist for a country to choose from, but the 
electorate may still want to show dissatisfaction by voting for an outsider or populist 
firebrand who promises economic windfalls or to hold the ubiquitous corrupt politicians 
accountable. There is nothing culturally unique about voter disenfranchisement with 
established political parties, nor is there anything regionally distinct about political 
parties in Japan and Korea stoking fears or promising unrealistic incentives to win an 
election. Look no further that the United States’ 2016 presidential primaries, where both 
parties have strong populist candidates vying for the party’s candidacy, and real estate 
mogul Donald Trump has threatened to run a third party ticket if necessary. 
* * *
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In conclusion, new administrations did have a fleeting effect on regional stability. 
Constraints, both domestically and from other regional actors restricted each new 
administration’s ability to deviate too far from the status quo. Both Japan and South 
Korea gained greater foreign policy autonomy and helped to democratize security policy 
for each country. Finally, this study cannot corroborate a link between instability and 
incomplete consolidation, as democratic consolidation appears to be more of an 
aspirational goal for states than an actual obtainable end state. Even those countries that 
meet the definition of full democratic consolidation are not safe from slipping back into 
populist politics during time of national uncertainty. 
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